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I. INTRODUCTION
How do you think they're going to get to customers? Through a
broadband pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now
what they would like to do is use my pipes free, but I ain't going to let
them do that because we have spent this capital and we have to have a
return on it. So there's going to have to be some mechanism for these
people who use these pipes to pay for the portion they're using. Why
should they be allowed to use my pipes?
The Internet can't be free in that sense, because we and the cable
companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! f.- or
Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts!
In an interview last November, then-SBC Telecommunications CEO
Edward Whitacre was exceptionally honest about his company's market
position. Representing half of the broadband duopoly,2 he confessed his
industry's disproportionate market power and his intention to seek
monopoly rents. SBC spokesman Michael Balmoris quickly insisted the
company will not block consumer access to popular Web sites, but
Whitacre's words-uttered the same week SBC won regulatory approval to
buy AT&T-were, and still are, frightening for many. Other
telecommunications executives have since stated either their intention or
desire to charge online content providers for the right to reach customers at
the fastest speeds.4 Thanks to recent Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") moves to change the regulatory system for broadband Internet
services, this business model is now completely legal.5 Even if broadband
1. At SBC, It's All About "Scale and Scope", BuSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005,
paras. 25-26, http://www.businessweek.com/@@n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/magazine/content/
05_45/b3958092.htm (containing an excerpt from an interview between Roger 0. Crockett
and Edward Whitacre, CEO, SBC Telecommunications). Whitacre was then CEO of SBC
Telecommunications, which has since merged with and adopted the moniker of AT&T; he is
now at the helm of the merged company.
2. While no one company provides broadband nationally, most customers are
effectively forced to choose among two broadband providers-a telephone company that
offers Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") service and a cable company that offers cable
modem service. This concentration grants these broadand service providers ("BSPs")
economic power characteristic of noncompetitive markets. See infra Section IV.A.
3. Arshad Mohammed, SBC Head Ignites Access Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005,
at DOI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/03/
AR200511030221 1.html.
4. H.R. REP. No. 109-470, pt. 1, at 60 (2006). See also How Real Is the Threat?,
FREEPRESS.NET, http://www.freepress.net/netfreedom/=threat (last visited Nov. 1, 2006)
(criticizing the heads of major telecommunications companies for their intentions to charge
content providers).




providers never actually blocked access to a single site, a doubtful
proposition addressed below, any preferential treatment based on payment
would radically reshape the character of the Internet.
Transposed to another sector of the national infrastructure, domestic
air travel, this scenario is patently offensive. Imagine showing up for an
overbooked flight. "The agent tells you that he's sorry, but as happens on
occasion the flight is oversold and you can't board. He then informs you
that only passengers who are staying at the XYZ hotel in Las Vegas may
fly to Las Vegas today because the XYZ hotel has paid his airline an extra
fee to make sure XYZ customers get to Las Vegas."'6 If even one company
in the competitive airline industry began this practice, a sizable bipartisan
majority in Congress would be justifiably outraged, decrying the practice
and declaring that air travel is too important to allow it.
Nonetheless, the majority in Congress appears cool to the proposed
legislation that would mandate network neutrality in the very
noncompetitive broadband industry. On June 8, 2006, the House passed a
sweeping telecommunications reform bill, H.R. 5252,7 with only nominal
network neutrality requirements. 8 In April, the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce rejected the network neutrality amendment
sponsored by Rep. Ed Markey;9 the full House did the same just before10
passing H.R. 5252. The bill strips the FCC of any rulemaking authority1iI 12 1-3
on the matter. Many Congressional Democrats, public interest groups,
• • 14
and online content providers are vocally angry.
Senator Ted Stevens has pushed another, substantially different
telecommunications reform bill, S. 2686,15 through committee. Senators
6. Steve Taylor & Larry Hettick, 'Net Neutrality: Is It Fair to Give Preferential
Treatment to Those Who Pay For It?, CONVERGENCE NEWSLETTER, at para. 2, Feb. 20, 2006,
http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/converg/2006/0220convergel .html?ts.
7. H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter H.R. 5252].
8. See id. at § 201.
9. Verne Kopytoff, Panel Dumps Net Neutrality: House Committee Drops Amendment
Banning Two- Tier Internet, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2006, at C1.
10. Marilyn Geewax, 'Network Neutrality' Supporters Vow Fight, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, June 10, 2006, at 3F.
11. H.R. 5252, supra note 7, at § 201.
12. Anne Broache, Democrats Attack New Bill Over Net Neutrality, ZDNET NEws,
Mar. 30, 2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9588_22-6056156.html.
13. Martin H. Bosworth, Net Neutrality Gets Short Shrift in Congress,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Mar. 29, 2006, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2006/03/
telecom bill.html.
14. See Roy Mark, 'Clear and Present Danger' for Telecom Reform Bill,
INTERNETNEws.coM, Mar. 30, 2006, http://www.Internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/
3595576.
15. S. 2686, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter S. 2686].
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Olympia Snowe and Byron Dorgan offered their network neutrality bill
16
as an amendment, which lost on an 11-11 tie. 17 During debate over the
amendment, Stevens gave a speech against the amendment that has since
become the object of much online derision.'8 Due in large part to the
political sensitivity of the network neutrality debate and the impending
election, the bill has not yet been scheduled for a floor vote and probably
will not be before the midterm Congressional elections. 19 Yet Congress
may reconsider it after the election. To speed its reconciliation with the
House version, Stevens has renamed the bill H.R. 5252; if it passes the full
Senate, it need not be reintroduced in the House before being heard by a
House/Senate Conference Committee. If this bill becomes law without
stronger protections for network neutrality, the current architectural and
business model of the Internet may become an historical artifact.
In this paper, I argue on behalf of legislation mandating network
neutrality, requiring broadband service providers to permit all legal,
nondestructive uses of their Internet service on the same financial terms. As
part of this principle, BSPs would be permitted to prevent destructive
transmissions and preserve network stability. BSPs could continue to
charge varying end-user prices based on neutral measures of bandwidth
such as maximum bandwidth and total amount of uploads and downloads,
16. See A Bill to Amend the Communications Act of 1934 to Ensure Net Neutrality, S.
2917, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter S. 2917].
17. Tom Abate, Network Neutrality Amendment Dies: Telecommunications Bill Goes to
Senate Without Provision Sought by Web Firms, S. F. CHRON., June 29, 2006, at Cl,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2006/06/29/NET.TMP.
18. See Tim Schneider, Mr. Stevens' Wild Ride Through a Series of Tubes,
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/521 (July 11, 2006, 2:56 CST). Many of those
mocking Stevens were already supporters of network neutrality legislation, but Paul
Holcomb, the author of one of the better known parodies, a techno music remix of the audio
recording, only came to that position after achieving Internet fame. Aaron Rutkoff, The
Internet: A Series of Spoofs, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Aug. 8, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/public
/article/SB 115403677535519628-C UbKQI7xk88JF6xlQxZhZmpB4_20060906.html?
mod--tffmain tff top. Further, many who already supported network neutrality were
quickly concerned that the mockery of Stevens was an unnecessary distraction from the
political battle. See, e.g., id. While interning at Public Knowledge, I recorded the Committee
meeting during which Stevens gave his speech. I believed that the speech itself was
newsworthy, so I edited out the other Senators' speeches, saved Stevens's speech as an
MP3, and pushed for Government Affairs Manager Alex Curtis to post it online, which he
did. Alex Curtis, Senator Stevens Speaks on Net Neutrality, http://www.publicknowledge.or
g/node/497 (June 28, 2006, 4:59 CST). While I have shared a laugh and experienced sheer
awe at the Internet phenomenon I helped to create, I quickly began to push for greater
decorum and on-point discussion of the policy debate at hand. See, e.g., Posting of Bill
Herman to Alex Curtis's Blog, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/497 (July 10, 2006,
4:58 CST).
19. See Lisa Caruso, Lobbying & Law - Outmanned, Outfoxed, Outspent, NAT'L J.,
Aug. 12, 2006, at 45.
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but not for the right to use certain sites or applications or to use them at full
upload/download speed.
While many proclaim the value of a neutral Internet platform and the
legal requirements to ensure it, few scholars urge BSPs to build a non-
neutral Internet architecture in order to discriminate among nondestructive
data. Christopher Yoo, Professor of Law and Director of the Technology &
Entertainment Law Program at Vanderbilt University, is the most visible
such author-at least in the legal community. In one article Yoo argues
BSPs should be permitted to restrict users in any way they see fit, though
he contends that restrictions will primarily be intended to manage network
congestion. 2 1 Elsewhere, he argues that a diverse set of specialized BSP
networks would be preferable to a redundant set of general-purpose
networks and that this anticipated positive development is hindered by a
neutrality regime.22 Unless one subscribes to a Lochneresque view of
private property rights23 or to the factually and legally mistaken notion that
BSPs enjoy editorial rights over the Internet,2 these two arguments-
congestion and network diversity-are two of the strongest arguments
against a neutral Internet. Further, a few high-profile proponents of a
generally neutral Internet share the fear of broadband discrimination but are
nonetheless opposed to a network neutrality mandate. They believe that
regulation should be postponed or that the regulatory cure may be worse
than the disease. In arguing for a network neutrality regime, I respond to
each of these claims. Because he actually supports a discriminatory Internet
architecture, I rebut Yoo throughout as the main voice of opposition, but I
reserve space at the end to insist that the disease is still much worse than
the cure.
In Part II, I present a generalized description and defense of the
networking principles that undergird the calls for network neutrality. In
Part III, I discuss some of the past and likely future instances of broadband
providers placing undue restrictions on subscribers' network uses. In Part
IV, I argue that the present level of competition is insufficient to ensure
neutral networks. In Part V, I demonstrate that ad hoc regulation is
inadequate to the task of stopping even the grossest anticompetitive acts of
network discrimination. Part VI briefly details a regulatory option that
20. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847 (2006) [hereinafter Yoo, Congestion].
21. Id.
22. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Yoo, Beyond], available at http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v 19/19HarvJ
LTechOOl.pdf.
23. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management", 97 MICH. L REv. 462, 463 (1998).
24. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1905-07.
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could better preserve neutrality into the future. In Part VII, I rebut four
major counterarguments, including the arguments that a neutrality mandate
would leave network administrators with too few tools to deal with network
congestion, would prevent an improvement in the form of several diverse
networks, should be postponed, or would do more harm via unintended
regulatory consequences. I conclude with a brief overview.
II. IN PRAISE OF NEUTRAL NETWORKS
Computer networks can be designed either to discriminate between
applications and data or to faithfully transmit all data regardless of content.
While a neutral network is not necessarily desirable in every type of
network architecture, the vast majority of stakeholders benefit the most
from a generally neutral network. In the first half of this Part, I discuss the
importance of a neutral network in encouraging and rewarding valuable,
unpredictable online innovation. Second, I detail the role that neutrality
serves in preserving important First Amendment values such as free speech
and freedom of the press.
A. A Stable Platform for Innovation
We have clear examples of both types of network architectures-
intelligent networks designed to carry specific types of information and
nondiscriminatory, stupid networks designed to carry any information users
send. An excellent example of the former model is the "smart" network
administered by AT&T through most of the last century. "[A]t every layer
in the distributional chain, the AT&T network had been optimized for
voice telephony. But this optimization meant that any effort to change a
layer in the AT&T distributional chain would disable other layers.... [S]o
change became impossibly difficult. ''2 5 In contrast, those who built the
Internet organized it on the latter model. 26 The network is "stupid,"
faithfully carrying all data and placing the intelligence at the ends of the
network. 27 While "smart" networks predestine certain uses, stupid-or
neutral-networks liberate "large amounts of innovative energy." 28 Neutral
networking protocols have unleashed the explosive growth of
unforeseeable, symbiotic online innovation in the recent past. From email
to the World Wide Web to wikis to peer-to-peer networking, the radical
innovations in networking applications have been built upon neutral
25. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 38 (2002).
26. See id. at 39.
27. See David S. Isenberg, The Dawn of the "Stupid Network," ACM NETWORKER,
Feb./Mar. 1994, at 26-27.
28. Id. at 27.
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Internet protocols. 29 It is therefore unsurprising that an informal survey of
computer technologist Web sites reveals that the community is nearly
unanimous in supporting network neutrality.
30
Over two decades ago, Jerome Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark
authored a clearly articulated case for neutral networking, 3 1 which is still
"amongst the most influential of all communication protocol design
guides.' 32 Network engineers still defend this design. "Stupid Networks
have three basic advantages over Intelligent Networks-abundant
infrastructure; underspecification; and a universal way of dealing with
underlying network details, thanks to IP (Internet Protocol), which was
designed as an 'internet-working' protocol." 33 Infrastructure is cheaper to
add, accelerating expansion and creating abundance. Further,
underspecified network architectures and a standard Internet-working
protocol empower innovation:
If I have a Stupid Network and I get an idea for a communications
application, I just write it. Then I send it to my buddy, and my buddy
can install it, too. If we both like it, we can send it to more people. If
people really 1iJ 4e it, then maybe we can charge for it - or even start our
own company.
Perhaps the most significant development on the Internet was the World
Wide Web, a user-friendly graphic user interface ("GUI") and effective
means for computers running different operating systems to communicate
with each other. The creator of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee,
developed the Web to perpetuate a neutral network built on end-to-end
principles.35 As neutral and therefore uncontrolled platforms, both the
29. See LESSIG, supra note 25, at 41.
30. See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Network Neutrality v. Platform Competition, SUSAN
CRAWFORD BLOG (Oct. 30, 2005, 15:32 EST), bttp://scrawford.blogware.com/blog/_archive
s/2005/10/30/1331319/html; Carlo Longino, Verizon Wireless: Scrap Network Neutrality,
TECHDIRT CORPORATE INTELLIGENCE, Nov. 10, 2005, http://techdirt.com/news/wireless/
article/6123; SBC CEO Slammed for Comments, BROADBANDREPORTS.CoM, Nov. 4, 2005,
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/69175 (featuring comments expressing particular
offense at Whitacre's proposal and defending the norm of neutrality).
31. Jerome H. Saltzer, David P. Reed & David D. Clark, End-to-End Arguments in
System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN CoMP. Sys. 277 (1984), available at
http://web.mit.edu/Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf.
32. Jean-Patrick Gelas, References: About "End-to-End" Arguments (Feb. 2004),
available at http://www.cs.utk.edu/-gelas/references.html.
33. Isenberg, supra note 27, at 27.
34. Isenberg, supra note 27, at 29.
35. TiM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB, 99 (Harper San Francisco 1999). Bemers-
Lee writes:
Whether inspired by free-market desires or humanistic ideals, we all felt that
control was the wrong perspective. ... Technically, if there was any centralized
point of control, it would rapidly become a bottleneck that restricted the Web's
growth, and the Web would never scale up. Its being "out of control" was very
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Internet generally and the Web specifically have spawned a dazzling rate
and range of innovation.
Threats to network neutrality could reduce the level and variety of
online innovation. Consider the worst-case scenario: a system where all
innovation is channeled through-and therefore must meet the interests
of-a major telecommunications firm. AT&T formerly prohibited the
attachment of all unapproved external devices to the phone system. The
"effect was to channel innovation through Bell Labs. Progress would be as
Bell Labs determined it." 36 Broadband providers are unlikely to attempt to
recreate the Internet on this model. Yet even modest rollbacks of the end-
to-end principle can greatly erode the creative power of the Internet.
"Whatever other closed and proprietary networks there might be, polluting
the Internet with these systems of control is a certain way to undermine the
innovation it inspires."
37
Consider the additional value of guaranteed neutrality from the
standpoint of innovators and the investment capitalists who fund them.
Lessig pleads for a neutrality regime in order to guarantee a stable,
predictable platform on which innovators can bank. "Their funding
depends on the existence of a stable, addressable market for their products.
Such developers would benefit the most from knowing that they can rely
on a [consistent] broadband network..."38
Just as the electrical grid gives innovators a stable, consistent system
on which one can count in developing applications,39 a neutral broadband
network permits innovators to plan based on stable expectations. This leads
to greater investment in cutting-edge applications and thus more
innovation. Even minor interruptions in the norm of neutrality, however,
cause market uncertainty, leaving investors to wonder which applications
or sites will be targeted next. This undermines the perceived future value
for networking innovations and threatens to reduce investment in research
and development and therefore reduce innovation itself.
Yoo insists BSPs will allow innovation because they are in a perfect
place to capitalize on the value of any useful progress. Under this model,however, broadband providers have a direct incentive to allow only those
important.
Id.
36. LESSIG, supra note 25, at 30.
37. LESSIG, supra note 25, at 156.
38. Ex parte Letter of Timothy Wu and Lawrence Lessig, Inquiry Concerning High-
Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities at 4 (Aug. 22, 2003),
http://faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wulessigfcc.pdf. [hereinafter Ex parte Letter].
39. Id.
40. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1888-89.
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innovations on which they can capitalize. 4 1 Yoo forgets that mandated
nondiscrimination was the policy bedrock on which the Internet revolution
was built:
Absent policy-mandated openness, the Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs) and monopoly franchise CATV networks would
certainly have explored only the paths of direct benefit to them. It is
doubtful that without such policy-mandated openness the Internet
Revolution would have occurred.
Indeed, many of the most successful paths challenged the very core of
the phone monopoly business as well as the industry's technology and
business assumptions. For example, the Internet is largely distance
price insensitive, .. . [which] forced profound change for the
traditional telephone companies.
If the then-current policy had permitted telephone companies to manage
network congestion by blocking or surcharging dialup access numbers, 3
the Internet as we know it may not have come to pass and certainly would
not be nearly as revolutionary. This disadvantage also applies, if not as
starkly, to a scenario under which telephone companies would have
adopted Whitacre's policies of charging Internet companies more than
customary telephone interconnection fees. Baby Bells would have had
every incentive to choke off Internet service providers ("ISPs") at rates that
gave the Bells near-monopoly control of the ISP market, allowing them to
charge excessive prices and/or deliver lower quality service. Despite the
gains in online access and creativity that have already come to pass, the
lack of a neutrality mandate could still today erode the potential for future
innovation.
Yoo dismisses the applicability of precedents from the era of
41. If BSPs begin charging intermediary fees, they will have an incentive to disfavor
nonmarket communication behind which there is no sender willing to pay for delivery. To
borrow from Benkler's analysis of the cost that strong copyright protection creates for
information inputs, major commercial content creators ("Mickeys") would be most able to
pay intermediary fees, while individual and group creators who seek no direct market
remuneration ("scholarly lawyers" and "Joe Einsteins") would be least able. This would
directly favor commercial over noncommercial content. See Yochai Benkler, Free As the
Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 401-12 (1999).
42. Francois Bar, et al., Defending the Internet Revolution in the Broadband Era: When
Doing Nothing is Doing Harm, E-conomy Working Paper 12, at 8 (Aug. 1999), available at
http://e-conomy.berkeley.edu/publications/wp/ewpl 2.pdf.
43. See Andrew Odlyzko, Pricing and Architecture of the Internet: Historical
Perspectives from Telecommunications and Transportation, Aug. 29, 2004, at 24,
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/pricing.architecture.pdf. He argues:
[F]lat rates for local calling played a key role in the rise of the Internet, by
promoting much faster spread of this technology in the U.S. than in other
countries.
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telephone monopolies, even while acknowledging that they helped spur
useful innovations. As he sees it, broadband competition is too stiff for
discrimination to occur in today's market.44 The classic, decades-old
telephone attachments cases, such as Hush-a-Phone45 and Carterfone,46 are
indeed from a different technological era. Nonetheless, perhaps no
regulatory lesson from today's telecommunications order rings louder than
the resounding success of government-mandated common carriage in
spurring online innovation over the past fifteen years. 47 If we are to turn
our backs on this successful strategy, we should do so only in the face of
compelling evidence, not just based upon whether the market is different,
but that things are so different as to require the exact opposite of what has
worked in the recent past. Especially in light of these past successes, Yoo's
description of "vibrant" broadband competition borders on laughable. In
almost every zip code in the U.S., the broadband market is highly
concentrated and certainly on no path toward meaningful competition. This
point merits further discussion, which I provide below.
4 8
B. An Open Channel for Communication
Most of the debates over network neutrality revolve around
innovation. A neutral network is also socially valuable in that it does not
discriminate based on the moral, political, or aesthetic value of content. A
neutral network is free not only to technological innovation but also to
controversial media content that would never be aired on older media
platforms such as television and radio. When permitted,
telecommunications companies have an incentive to restrict certain speech
based exclusively on the claim that offensive content is bad for business.
49
Preserving a neutral network is therefore a clear means of furthering First
Amendment values.
The First Amendment stands for more than prohibiting government
censorship. First Amendment values are best upheld by ensuring media
diversity-not merely content diversity, but a diversity of stakeholders who
have editorial control over that content. This is especially true in an era
44. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1878-1879.
45. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
46. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 F.C.C.2d 420
(1968).
47. Bar, supra note 42, at 6-10.
48. See infra, Part IV.
49. C. Edwin Baker, Merging Phone and Cable, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 97,
123 (1994) [hereinafter Baker, Merging].
50. See C. Edwin Baker, Commentary, Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the
First Amendment, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 733, 734-39 (2005) [hereinafter Baker, Ownership
Policy]. Baker supports media diversity in the name of the democratic value of diffusing
[Vol. 59
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when gigantic firms with large shares of media markets can dictate the
contents of our information ecosystem.5 1 For decades, the Court has held
that the health of our democracy demands "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources .. ,,52
While this is subject to other First Amendment values such as editorial
discretion, 53 it is upheld as the guiding principle in the current case law
regulating cable television. 54 Cable companies certainly have a reasonable
claim to editorial discretion, yet they are forced to carry certain programs in
the name of a healthy local news sector and greater net diversity of news
outlets. The value of diversity is even clearer in the case of BSPs, who
disavow any editorial control over the Internet. Wu and Lessig also dismiss
the idea of BSPs as editors. 55 This claim can be extended into an even
clearer argument for a neutrality regime. At least one First Amendment
scholar believes the Constitution requires state intervention when state-
created telecommunications monopolies obstruct the speech of their
customers.
56
In contrast, Yoo implies that First Amendment values are best upheld
by permitting broadband providers to act as editors of the Internet.5 This
elides the utter lack of either a general expectation or industry-wide
practice of editorial discretion on the part of ISPs-not to mention the
clause tucked into the Communications Decency Act specifically stating
that ISPs are not editors. 58 It is more useful to view each content creator or
end-user as her own editor of the Internet, subject to other non-ISP
exceptions such as workplace norms and content-filtering software.
editorial power rather than the mistaken belief that more diverse ownership will inherently
create more diverse content.
51. See generally, e.g., ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA: U.S.
COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2004). [hereinafter
MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM].
52. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
53. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241,261 (1974).
54. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1l), 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997).
55. Ex parte Letter, supra note 38, at 9. "Primarily, it is the ends-the user of the
Internet or a remote speaker-who decide on the content of transmission, not the broadband
operator. The only influence the operator has over the content of what it carries is through
the act of restricting usage or blocking content." Ex parte Letter, supra note 38, at 9.
56. Baker, Merging, supra note 49, at 124, n.107.
57. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1905-07.
58. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000). "No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider." Id. The same paragraph does exempt ISPs from civil claims
resulting from good-faith efforts to obstruct objectionable materials. Id. at § 230(c)(2)(A).
Especially when read in light of the immediately preceding clause, however, this content-
specific protection from liability is clearly not to be confused with a recognition of editorial
rights in general.
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Especially in light of the value that the court places on editorial diversity,
the First Amendment claim of editorial control for broadband providers is
strained indeed.
On the uncensored Internet, "[j]ust about anybody could own a digital
printing press, and have worldwide distribution."59 Internet communicators
can bypass the inherently narrower editorial control of old media, a
60development embraced by authors of all political stripes. Among other
positive outcomes, this opens the political game to outsiders, creating
several political outcomes in which government officials who expected
little public resistance were suddenly restrained by popular campaigns.61
The point is not that we should allow unfettered online
communication merely because that communication can and does permit
those with relatively less power to shape political outcomes; this is just one
of the most obvious positive results of a suddenly much more equitable
spread of communication power. Cast in more general terms, we as a
society should guarantee that every online communicator serves as his or
her own uncensored editor because that best upholds the democratic values
of free speech and freedom of the press. Now that we have a
communication system with the technical capacity to support millions of
independent media outlets, we should guarantee that the editorial control
over that system stays as widely diversified as possible. A broadband
provider should no more be able to stop a customer's email or blog post
due to its political content than a telephone comp any should be permitted to
dictate the content of customers' conversations. 2 The guarantee that these
speech acts be legally unconstrained "is a fundamental aspect of individual
liberty.
6 3
Yoo disagrees. He argues that media diversity should, at least
59. DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM, BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE
PEOPLE 13 (2004).
60. See generally, e.g., JOE TRIPPI, THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE TELEVISED:
DEMOCRACY, THE INTERNET, AND THE OVERTHROW OF EVERYTHING (2004); HUGH HEWTT,
BLOG: UNDERSTANDING THE INFORMATION REFORMATION THAT'S CHANGING YOUR WORLD
(2005) (arguing that the Internet uniquely permits the dissemination of their preferred brand
of left- or right-wing views, respectively, and therefore facilitates widespread political
change).
61. See, e.g., BRUCE BIMBER, INFORMATION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: TECHNOLOGY
IN THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL POWER 2-4 (2003) (describing how libertarians used online
communication to reverse FDIC policy); MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note 51, at 280
(discussing how multiple groups of online activists helped reverse FCC policy). The role of
information in breaking up "iron triangle" political favoritism is well documented. See, e.g.,
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (1993).
62. See Baker, Merging, supra note 49, at 100.
63. Baker, Merging, supra note 49, at 100.
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generally, 64 take a back seat to economic efficiency. Further, he accuses
neutrality proponents of failing to help policymakers decide when we have
"enough" diversity and suggests the state should begin permitting the
benefits of concentration such as economic efficiency. For example, he
acknowledges:
There is not[h]ing incoherent about imposing regulation to promote
values other than economic welfare. The problems... are more
practical than conceptual. Unless protecting the widest possible
diversity of sources is a virtue in and of itself that trumps all other
values, such a theory must provide a basis for quantifying the
noneconomic benefW and for determining when those benefits justify
the economic costs.
This is a straw-man representation of neutrality advocates specifically and
those who support diversified media ownership generally. It is an
artificially high burden of proof to expect them to defend media diversity in
the face of all other values. Yoo has not demonstrated much risk to other
constitutional values that are considered comparable to First Amendment
values. His concern is for admittedly minor gains in economic efficiency,
which is best achieved under a neutrality regime. 67 As far as the courts are
concerned, efficiency weighs little compared to a genuine First
Amendment claim. Second, the cited authors provide more than incoherent
arguments on behalf of the belief that a diversity of voices is a more
important value. For instance, in the article that Yoo cites, Benkler
references an earlier article6 9 in which he argues:
Justice Breyer recognized that [cable] regulation "extracts a serious
First Amendment price." But, he wrote, that price can be justified by
the "'basic tenet of [our] national communications policy, namely, that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."' That
policy is not an economic policy, but rather "seeks to facilitate the
public discussion and informed deliberation, which, as Justice
Brandeis pointed out many years ago, democratic$ government
presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve."
64. I make this caveat on Yoo's behalf; he details no exceptions.
65. Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 53-57.
66. Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 54 (internal citation omitted).
67. See infra, Parts II.A & IV.
68. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 565-
68, 578 (2000).
69. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 376-77 (1999).
70. Id. (citing Turner II, 520 U.S. at 226-27 (Breyer, J., concurring in part)) (internal
citations omitted).
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When weighing the First Amendment value of increased diversity against
other First Amendment values, communication diversity is the core value
guiding communication policy and therefore wins in this highly analogous
case. For neutrality proponents and for the Turner H Court, economic
efficiency is an even less important value.7 1 This is certainly true for other
well-reasoned communication law and policy scholars who would gladly
trade economic efficiency in favor of constitutional values such as a diverse
information ecosystem 72 or privacy.73 Benkler and the Turner H Court may
be unpersuasive to Yoo, but many have argued quite coherently that
economic efficiency is not our country's core value.
Perhaps Yoo finds those who believe in the primacy of a
democratically diversified media system to be incoherent because he
stubbornly refuses to speak their language. For instance, as he alleges
elsewhere, "by valuing speech for its contributions to democracy, these
theories adopt a consequentialist approach that is at odds with the
autonomy-centered vision that has long dominated free speech theory."
74
Yet even the very footnote in which he makes this claim cites an article by
Baker that contends that literally any incremental diversity is better due to
the inherently more democratic diversification of editorial power:
For many people (and most theories), true democracy implies as wide
as practical a dispersal of power within public discourse. Dispersal of
ownership also may promote the availability and consumption of
diverse content-but no theorist of whom I am aware believes that this
will always be true. But democratic values mean that it makes a huge
difference whether any lack of a particular type of diversity is imposed
by a few powerful actors or reflects the independent judgments of
many different people, for example, owners, with the ultimate power to
determine content. The key goal, the key value, served by ownership
dispersal is that it directly embodies a fairer, more democratic
71. Additionally, note that economic efficiency is not necessarily the product of
unconstrained market behavior; especially in the case of economically atypical products
such as media content, a great degree of regulation is often required to maximize efficiency.
See C. EDwIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 20 (2002) [hereinafter BAKER,
MEDIA].
72. See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note 51, at 236; Mark Cooper, Open
Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic Discrimination in Closed,
Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1011, 1020 (2000); see generally Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996)
(arguing that copyright law should be crafted to maximize the health of debate in civil
society, drawing a contrast between himself and those who seek to maximize copyright's
economic efficiency).
73. See OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION (1993).




allocation of communicative power.75
As far as Baker is concerned, promoting maximally democratic control
over the media is part of autonomy-enhancing democracy rather than a cog
in some "consequentialist" belief; any diversification of communication
power promotes procedural democracy. "Without more, and regardless of
empirical investigations or controversial economic analyses, this value
judgment provides a proper reason to oppose any media merger or to favor
any policy designed to increase the number of separate owners of media
entities." 6 Interpretations vary, of course, but that is not unique to the
value of procedural democracy. The pseudo-objectivity that Yoo applies to
the economic question of the BSP market's competitiveness, critiqued
below, illustrates that both core values in this debate suffer from the same
problem.
Epithets of incoherence aside, Yoo is really accusing neutrality
proponents of failing to explain why their values outweigh his. On this
count, Baker provides quite solid justifications for his reasonable policy
stance: promote maximum media ownership wherever possible until and
unless other considerations prove overwhelming. 77 On the other hand, Yoo
himself fails quite ironically "to engage in even a minimally adequate
,78normative or policy analysis of the issue. Yoo's rhetorical move is a
clever trick, inverting the burden of proof that he should face. Considering
the almost incomparable value of the First Amendment in the U.S. legal
canon, and the current case law that defines that value as requiring diversity
of opinion, Yoo should be proving why economic efficiency outweighs
communications diversity in general or in this particular policy debate. As
an even less supportable debate trick, he expects those who support
diversity to prove their value claims on his terms-in a quantitative form
that translates these values into a form that can be weighed in his economic
calculus. 79 Yet he offers no such calculus.
75. Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 734-35 (internal citations omitted).
76. Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 735.
77. Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 734-41.
78. Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 741 (internal citation omitted).
79. Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 54. Disappointingly, Yoo relies on economic
analysis based in antitrust debates that happened in other industries. He argues, for instance,
that, "[o]ver time, courts and commentators began to recognize that because many industries
are subject to economies of scale, preserving small producers has a price." Yoo, Beyond,
supra note 22, at 55. Yet this begs the question of whether, as a society, we should or do
value diversity of control in media at a higher level than diversity in other industries-or
whether communication should actually be entirely commodified. On this last point, see
Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 742-47. Further, adding the production of media
content to the list of economic activities that enjoy economies of scale is more than mere
understatement; it elides properly economic reasons that justify media exceptionalism and
challenges the applicability of general economic regulatory strategies. For almost every type
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Unless Yoo believes that the democratic value of diversified
communication power could not possibly trump economic efficiency, he
has also failed to provide a coherent means of deciding which values
should win under which circumstances. He derides his opponents for
making such decisions based on an approach that "has remained decidedly
ad hoc, ' 8° but not even two accurate, valid systems for measuring these
abstract values separately could (or should) determine which is more
important under which circumstances. A human intermediary would still
have to decide upon the exchange rate between the two currencies. Yoo's
demand for a quantifiable a priori means of resolving interminable value
debates is therefore misguided at best. After all, "it is harder to get
agreement about which things are ugly or which actions evil than about
which things are rectangular." 82 If Yoo expects media policy scholars to
solve the problem of moral objectivity and create objective justifications
for First Amendment principles, he is asking them to solve a philosophical
problem deemed insoluble by some of the greatest American philosophers
of the last century.83 There may be no quantifiable or even objective reason
why Comcast should not be granted editorial discretion over their
of media product, the "first copy" costs of developing and marketing something to
reproduce and distribute greatly overwhelms the costs of reproduction and distribution.
Unlike almost every other type of product imaginable, media products as a rule feature
marginal costs that are almost always lower than average costs. GILLIAN DOYLE,
UNDERSTANDING MEDIA ECONOMICS, 13-14 (2002). This public good characteristic of media
leads to underproduction of "some media content that an audience wants--content whose
value as measured by willingness to pay is greater than its cost." See BAKER, MEDIA, supra
note 71, at 20. It can also lead to ruinous competition. BAKER, MEDIA, supra note 71, at 30-
31. It is careless for Yoo to apply rebuttals to populist antitrust reasoning without discussing
these fundamental economic differences between media products and most other products.
Further, considering the disproportionately high degree of externalities in the media
industry, drawing on precedents primarily reached in other industries is arguably a
substantial straw-manning of those who support media regulation that exceeds the antitrust
regulation appropriate in other sectors. BAKER, MEDIA, supra note 71, at 10-11.
80. Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 55.
81. Even antitrust suits that consider only the economic efficiency end of Yoo's
proposed two-value equation are notoriously unpredictable. See, e.g., James B. Speta, FCC
Authority to Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 19-
20 (2003).
82. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 51 (1999).
83. Rorty, for instance, approvingly describes John Dewey's defense of democracy:
Dewey offered neither the conservative's philosophical justification of democracy
by reference to eternal values nor the radical's justification by reference to
decreasing alienation. He did not try to justify democracy at all. He saw
democracy not as founded upon the nature of man or reason or reality but as a
promising experiment engaged in by a particular herd of a particular species of
animal ... Dewey's conservative critics denounced him for fuzziness, for not
giving us a criterion of growth. But Dewey rightly saw that any such criterion
would cut the future down to the size of the present.
Id. at 119-20.
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customers' online speech, but there are still plenty of coherent reasons.
III. BOTTLENECKS AND ROADBLOCKS: ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL
THREATS OF DISCRIMINATION
There are several well-documented past and current instances of BSPs
preventing their users from making nondestructive uses of their
connections; augmenting them is a reasonable fear of some content
discrimination and widespread economic discrimination. In perhaps the
only such empirical work to date, Tim Wu "surveyed the network designs
(to the extent that the information was available) and usage restrictions in
subscriber agreements and incorporated acceptable use policies . . .,84 of
the nation's ten largest cable modem and six largest DSL service providers
as of 2002. While many of these network designs and usage restrictions are
in place at the time of this writing, the problem has shifted substantially.
Today, actual discrimination is at levels high enough to be worrisome, and
potential discrimination threatens to grow to catastrophic levels.
In the first subpart, I detail the continuing discrimination against
Voice over Internet Protocol ("VolP"). Second, I examine how the threat to
block specific applications such as VoIP and peer-to-peer networking
distorts the market for online innovation. Third, I consider content-specific
threats to neutrality that may erode customers' right to serve as their own
editors. Finally, I rebut the claim that the lack of endemic discrimination
today demonstrates the lack of a need for neutrality regulations going
forward.
A. Voice over Internet Protocol ("VoIP")
Since Wu's article, perhaps the most anticompetitive discrimination
has been BSPs' blocking of VolP traffic. VolP allows one to make and
receive phone calls over a broadband connection without paying interstate
long distance fees. Vonage, for instance, offers a VoP package that
includes free long distance to the U.S. and Canada for $24.99 per month.8 5
For BSPs in the voice telephony business, this cuts into their core business
model, creating an incentive to discriminate. Even Yoo objects to this type
of discrimination. "Another anticompetitive problem that can arise in a
convergent world is when a broadband provider bars access to an Internet
application that competes directly with its core business. One example is
Madison River Communication's attempt to protect its local telephone
84. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 156-57 (2003).
85. Vonage, Vonage: Leading the Internet Phone Revolution, Residential Premium
Unlimited Plan, http://www.vonage.com/products_premium.php (last visited Nov.3, 2006).
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business by blocking its DSL customers from using VolP."8 6 In the ensuing
case,87 the FCC cited Madison for failing to fulfill its duties of common
carriage. 8 Madison settled the case for $15,000 and promised to stop
blocking VolP traffic on its networks.8 9 While Madison appears to be
holding to its end of the bargain, other telephone companies appear to be
preventing or discouraging VolP use on their networks. Vonage insists that
two other BSPs have still blocked their calls, as discussed below.
9 1
Further, a Canadian BSP has begun surcharging competitors' VolP
services:
Shaw Communications recommends that users signing up for non-
Shaw VoIP services pay a $10 monthly QoS (Quality of Service) fee to
ensure their voice service is reliable. That doesn't seem like an
unreasonable policy. After all, VoIP requires higher QoS treatment
than, say, file sharing. The catch in this case is that in addition to being
an infrastructure provider, Shaw also offers a cable telephone service,
which competes directly with other VoIP offerings. By recommending
consumers pay a fee to ensure their non-Shaw VolP is reliable, Shaw is
making its own voice offering more attractive.
Even the "reasonable" part of Shaw's argument, that VolP requires better
QoS treatment, has more intuitive appeal than basis in empirical reality. Ed
Felten, Professor of Computer Science at Princeton University, concludes
that home broadband connections are generally fast enough to support
VoP--despite unexpected fluctuations in speed. 93 This monthly fee maybe nothing more than the sale of digital snake oil, but if customers do need
86. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1899.
87. In re Madison River Commc'ns, LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
88. Id. at para. 1 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 201(b)).
89. Id. at para 5.
90. Ben Charny, Vonage Says Its Calls Are Still Being Blocked, Mar. 21, 2005,
http://news.com.comN/Vonage+says+its+calls+are+still+being+blocked/2100-7352'_3-
5628564.html?part=rss&tag=5628564&subj =news.
91. See infra Part V.
92. Michael Martin, Government Must Get In the Ring for Net Neutrality Fight,
PCWORLD.CA, Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.pcworld.ca/news/article/f7dfd9730a01040800afa
a8552023f80/pg0.htm.
93. Ed Felten, Quality of Service: A Quality Argument?, FREEDOM TO TINKER, Feb. 9,
2006, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p--973:
If speed doesn't drop entirely to zero but fluctuates, with peaks and valleys, then
even the valleys may be high enough to give the app what it needs. This is starting
to happen for voice conversations-Skype and other VoIP systems seem to work
pretty well without any special QoS support in the network.
We can't say that QoS is never needed, but experience does teach that it's easy,
especially for non-experts, to overestimate the importance of QoS. That's why I'm
not convinced-though I could be, with more evidence-that QoS is a strong
argument against net neutrality rules.
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Shaw's QoS, it is likely because Shaw is degrading competing VolP
services. Without strong network neutrality requirements, expect U.S.
BSPs to follow Shaw's lead with the goal of avoiding Madison River
Communications' fate but still driving up business for extra fees and their
own VolP services.
B. Threatened Innovation
Until the last few years, BSPs relied on simple port blocking to
degrade or restrict disfavored applications. Today, network managers have
much more sophisticated tools at their disposal. "Since sophisticated,
packet-level network-management tools allow administrators to determine
the types of traffic flowing across their networks, it's possible for network
operators to 'block' or otherwise degrade the service for specific types of
traffic." 94 Blocking VolP is just one such threat. In another, several BSP
executives have publicly threatened to block peer-to-peer traffic, just one
example of the general problem of threatened innovation. Additionally,
many telecommunications executives have publicly threatened to charge
extra fees for valuable services simply because they can.96 As soon as a
new application increases the value of network resources (e.g., VPNs) or
disproportionately draws upon those resources (e.g., peer-to-peer), BSPs
may have the economic incentive to surcharge or degrade those services.
BSPs can demand fees from end-users in relation to the perceived value of
the new technology or block bandwidth-hogging tools in lieu of upgrading
their networks or their billing systems. This systematically favors the
technological status quo, reducing the competition for new online
innovations and therefore reducing social welfare.
Yoo denies that application suppression and taxation will lead to
decreases in welfare. He insists instead that network owners are in an ideal
position to capture all of the marginal value of increases in the worth of
their networks.97 Yet even if BSPs allow all innovations to come and seek
only to capture any increased value in the network, 98 this greatly reduces
the profitability of future innovations and therefore erodes the incentive to
innovate. Whitacre's threat to extract the positive value of online progress
94. Paul Kapustka, Clearwire May Block VoIP Competitors, NETWORKINGPIPELINE,
Mar. 25, 2005, http://www.networkingpipeline.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=1599057
72.
95. E.g., Cynthia Brumfeld, BellSouth: We Might Want to Block Ports, IP DEMOCRACY,
Oct. 25, 2005, http://www.ipdemocracy.com/archives/000656bellsouth-wemight_want_
toblock_ports.php.
96. H.R. REP. No. 109-470, pt. 1, at 60.
97. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1891.
98. This is a dubious claim, considering BSPs' historical willingness to suppress
innovations such as VoIP that challenge their current business model.
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constitutes a "socially perverse" 99 tax on innovation with unforeseeable and
unacceptable deadweight losses. These losses are even higher than the sum
of the losses due to each initial lost innovation. Every online innovation
builds on earlier online innovations,100 so innovations that do not happen
today are magnified exponentially, creating many more lost innovations
and greatly reducing social welfare tomorrow.
By urging regulators to permit discrimination, Yoo turns his back on
the very policies that led to the Internet's success. The threat to peer-to-
peer is merely emblematic of what, if left unchecked, will be a looming
cloud over the head of generations of tomorrow's innovators.
C. Restrictions on Content
In a further violation of network neutrality, broadband providers
explicitly reserve the right to censor the content uploaded or downloaded
by their customers. This policy statement by Cox Communications is
typical: "Cox reserves the right to refuse to post or to remove any
information or materials from the Service, in whole or in part, that it, in
Cox's sole discretion, deems to be offensive, indecent, or otherwise
objectionable."''0 AT&T takes it up a notch, reserving the right to block
any content for any reason. "AT&T and its designees shall have the right
(but not the obligation) to monitor any and all traffic routed though [sic] the
Service, and in their sole discretion to refuse, block, move or remove any
Content that is available via the Service. '' 102 Further, in July 2005, "Telus,
Canada's second largest telecommunications company, actively blocked
access to Voices for Change, a website supporting the Telecommunications
Workers Union.
1°3
99. See Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 748. Baker highlights the difference
between welfare-based economics, which seeks to optimize total social value, and
enterprise-based economics. To wit:
Of course, the enterprise's economist might be sensitive to some of these [broader
welfare values] for instrumental, but sometimes socially perverse, reasons. The
economist might check for newly created opportunities to externalize costs
cheaply or identify someone from whom to collect (internalize) some of the
enterprise's otherwise positive externalities. Neither of these, however, and
certainly not the first, should be treated as welfare enhancing or efficient even
though beneficial to the firm.
Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 748.
100. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 67 (2004).
101. Cox Communications, Acceptable Use Policy, User Content, http://www.cox.com/
policy/default.asp# (last updated Feb. 22, 2005).
102. AT&T Worldnet, AT&T DSL Service Subscriber Agreement, http://www.att.net/
general-info/terms-dsl-data.html#term (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (Find Section 10 titled
"ABCs of AT&T Worldnettiquette". Go to Section "b." beneath "Content; Your Conduct
And Use Of The Service").
103. Michael Geist, Telecommunications Policy Review Submission, at 5, (Aug. 2005)
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In the not-too-distant past, dialup ISPs exercised fairly censorious
powers over private online speech; they regulated the content of forums,
10 4
private chat, and email. 10 5 The fact that BSPs universally reserve the right
to exercise that authority over any type of online communication carried
over their pipes is unsettling, whether they exercise that right frequently or
rarely. "The system of freedom of expression requires institutional
arrangements that promote rather than impede people's opportunities to
communicate. Censorship, whether by governmental, private, or structural
forces, is presumptively objectionable."' 06 Further, infrequent exercise of
this power does not disprove the essential point. As Baker observed in
relation to the abuses of media concentration generally, "[a]lthough this
power may seldom or never be exercised, no democracy should risk the
danger."' 1 7 Even competition in the market is insufficient to guarantee that
last-mile-providers will not engage in censorship. "The owner of the
second wire is often likely to engage in the same censorship, for the same
reasons, as the owner of the first wire."10 8 In that light, it is best to prevent
even the threat of BSP censorship.
D. Why Tomorrow Looks Scarier Than Today
Congressional opponents of network neutrality insist that the policy is
unnecessary because discrimination is relatively rare today. The
broadband providers' candor regarding their intention to begin
discriminating, however, should be proof enough that today's generally
nondiscriminatory Internet is in danger." 10 When the boardroom members
of several major companies describe a new business model for an industry
that imposes massive deadweight losses on the rest of society, Congress
should take them seriously and legislate accordingly.
Further, the current historic moment is an anomaly not to be taken as
representative. The dial-up Internet was built on telephone networks, and
telephone companies were and are regulated as common carriers.
Broadband, however, was in a much more nebulous regulatory position
http://www.telecomreview.ca/epic/Internet/intprp-gecrt.nsf/vwapj/Geist-Michael.pdf/$FILE
/GeistMichael.pdf.
104. Mike Taylor, Conversations with Fred, MIDDLESEX NEWS, Nov. 6, 1990, available
at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Online-services/?f=prodigy-roosevelt-dimes.article.txt.
105. Home: Censorship: Online Services, Electronic Frontier Foundation: Defending
Freedom in the Digital World (May 26, 1992), http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Online_
services/?f=-aol secret tos.manual.txt.
106. Baker, Merging, supra note 49, at 122.
107. Baker, Ownership Policy, supra note 50, at 735.
108. Baker, Merging, supra note 49, at 123.
109. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 109-470, pt.1, at 6.
110. See id.
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until 2005. Through a series of FCC decisions and a Supreme Court
decision, cable and DSL providers went from possibly (cable) or
presumptively (DSL) regulated as common carriers to virtually
unregulated."I I Cable and telecommunications companies now want
specific policy reforms out of Congress, largely embodied in the
telecommunications bill that has just passed the House 1 2 and the
somewhat different bill being considered in the Senate 113 as of this writing.
Both industries are exceedingly anxious to avoid network neutrality
regulations, and in any case they have not yet implemented particularly
sophisticated network management technology, so they have avoided
anything that could be seen as justifying mandated neutrality. 1 4 If H.R.
5252 becomes law without network neutrality attached, BSPs are very
likely to engage in discriminatory behavior for their own enrichment.
BSPs have explicitly and enthusiastically explained their intentions to
begin discriminating, and the history and economics of information carriers
in noncompetitive markets suggests the same. In the 1860s, ". . .Western
Union, the telegraph monopolist, signed an exclusive deal with the
Associated Press. Other wire services were priced-off the network-not
blocked, but discriminated against. The result was to build Associated
Press into a news monopoly that was not just dangerous for business, but
dangerous for American democracy."' 15 AT&T's refusal to allow
nondestructive attachments-until ordered to do so-is another example.
116
When one or two communication companies dominate a market, it is
historically unrealistic to expect them to refrain from discrimination
without regulation. The FCC has very recently removed the threat of BSP
regulation, but the threat of new legislation is keeping BSPs on their best
behavior. If that threat passes, expect discrimination to become the norm as
Whitacre and others describe.
111. See infra Part IV.A. See generally Arshad Mohammed, FCC May Let Phone
Companies Off DSL Hook, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2005, at D05, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/03/AR2005080302126.
html.
112. See H.R. 5252, supra note 7.
113. See S. 2686, supra note 15.
114. Edward W. Felten, Nuts and Bolts of Network Neutrality, at 11 (Aug. 2006),
available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/neutrality.pdf.
115. Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access.
Hearing Before the Task Force on Telecom and Antitrust of the Comm. on the Judiciary,





IV. CURRENT BROADBAND COMPETITION GUARANTEES LITTLE
Yoo insists that competition in the broadband market is adequate to
prevent anticompetitive discrimination on the part of broadband
providers. 17 FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin supports the belief that the
last-mile broadband market is competitive, though he reserves the right to
mandate neutrality should broadband providers begin placing restrictions
on users for reasons other than network management. 11 Both further insist
that even greater competition is just around the comer due to technologies
such as wireless and Broadband over Power Line ("BPL") transmission,
even though Yoo's optimistic scenario features at most three differentiated
BSPs for most U.S. households,11 9 which is still not a competitive
market.' 20 Any effort to label the current broadband market as competitive
is wildly optimistic, to say the least. In most of the country, one or two
providers dominate the market and therefore enjoy substantive market
power over price and quality of service. While new technologies are
expected to dent this system of regional duopolies, the era of truly vibrant
competition is many years ahead under the best scenario if it is to come at
all-a condition that is hardly guaranteed.
In this Part, I first demonstrate that the broadband market is far from
competitive and explain how the system of regional duopolies discredits
Yoo's primary mechanism--consumer choice-for restraining
monopolistic behavior. Second, I argue that the only free market
mechanism that could preserve a generalized norm of neutrality is the
competitive pressure of regional broadband competition at the consumer
level-and not, as Yoo suggests, the quest by Web site and application
developers for national market share. Third, I briefly describe why new
delivery technologies may actually never solve the last-mile problem.
Finally, I co-opt Yoo's cable television analogy, as it provides an excellent
policy precedent for regulation to preserve content diversity.
A. Reigning Duopolies Gaining Speed
The first and only two vehicles for home broadband to enjoy
widespread adoption are coaxial cable, which was first deployed to carry
television signals, and DSL service, carried over telephone lines. These
117. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1878-79.
118. See Press Release, Chairman Kevin J. Martin Comments on Commission Policy
Statement (Aug. 5, 2005), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-260435
A2.pdf [hereinafter Martin Comments on Policy Statement].
119. See id.
120. Even if all three competitors have one-third market shares (33 points), the
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index score is 3267, nearly double the "highly concentrated"
threshold of 1800. See infra Part IV.A.
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vehicles currently serve almost the entire broadband market. "Today, cable
and DSL providers control almost 98 percent of the residential and small-
business broadband market."' 12 1 Over one quarter of consumers have just
one choice-cable (23 percent) or DSL (5 percent). 122 Even in well-
populated markets with both services available, typical residential
broadband customers have one choice for each type of service. "In many
markets, consumers face a duopoly, forced to choose between a single
cable provider and single DSL provider-many of which bundle broadband
with television or telephone service for a pricier package."'
123
As measured by widely hailed economic standards, nearly every
regional broadband market is very highly concentrated. In measuring
market concentration, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission use the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index ("HHIl"). To obtain the
HHI, square each firm's percentage market share and sum the squares; a
higher HHI represents a more concentrated market. For instance, consider a
very optimistic scenario where four broadband firms in a region each have
25 percent of the market. By taking the square of each firm's market share
(that is, 25 squared, or 625) and adding them all up (625 + 625 + 625 +
625), one obtains an HHI score of 2500. Note that this is the lowest
possible HHI for four firms. If two had 40 percent market share each and
the others had 10 percent, the HHI would be 3400. An HHI between 1000
and 1800 indicates moderate market concentration; a market over 1800 is
highly concentrated. 124 The broadband market in a typical region is over
5000, explained by the FCC:
If we assume that a typical residential (and small business) market
consists of the ILEC provider, one cable provider, and one other non-
ILEC, and assume that the national figures can be used to represent a
typical local market, the HHI is approximately 5200. If we don't allow
for an additional non-ILEC and again assuming that the national
numbers of ILEC/RBOC and cable non-ILEC can be used to calculate
market shares representative of a typical local bro fsand market, the
HiHI ranges between approximately 5500 and 5800.
121. S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK: THE FCC IGNORES AMERICA'S
DIGITAL DIVIDE 3, FREE PRESS (Aug. 2005), http://www.freepress.net/docs/broadband-report
.pdf.
122. Id. at 15.
123. Id.
124. Appendix to Complaint, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Calculations, United States v.
UPM-Kymmene, OYJ (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2003) (Civ. No. 03C-2528), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200900/200942a.pdf
125. Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 and 101 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate
the Provision of Fixed and Mobile Broadband Access, Educational and Other Advanced
Services in the 2150-2162 and 2500-2690 MHz Bands, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 6722, para. 124 (2003).
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The typical broadband market has an HHI roughly three times that required
for a market to be considered highly concentrated. 126 "Measures of typical
local broadband markets, moreover, understate the problem because they
ignore the fact that in some local markets there is no competition at all or,
where it does exist, it is only available to some of the customers within the
market." 127 If there are any, there are certainly no more than a handful of
residential broadband markets that are truly competitive. Making policy
decisions based on the assumption of vigorous competition is therefore
misguided.
The tepid competition in the broadband market will soon be even
weaker. It is technically possible for cable and telecommunications firms to
allow other BSPs to offer service over the same set of wires. As part of the
common carner regulatory legacy of telephony provision,
telecommunications firms that sell DSL had been required to provide
access to competing BSPs. Cable companies, in contrast, were classified as
providing "information services" and were therefore free to block
competitors from using their lines. An independent BSP, Brand X Internet
Services, challenged this classification in federal court in an effort to secure
access to customers via cable lines.
Overruling the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court ruled that the FCC
was within its statutory rights to classify cable as an information service
and therefore exclude cable companies from common carriage
regulation. 12 8 Within weeks, the Commission then ruled that DSL was also
an information service. Thanks to this reclassification, DSL carriers are no
longer subject to the requirement that they share DSL lines with broadband
competitors; the FCC required that carriers honor existing agreements for
one year, which expired in August, 2006.129 "Now that these rules have
been abandoned, consumers in even the largest markets will be restricted to
two choices-the local cable provider or the local DSL provider. This
duopoly ensures higher prices, slower connection speeds and poorer
customer service. 1  Considering that unregulated cable BSPs have
126. This makes Chairman Martin's claim of a competitive market utterly indefensible.
127. Harvey Reiter, The Contrasting Policies of the FCC and FERC Regarding the
Importance of Open Transmission Networks in Downstream Competitive Markets, 57 FED.
COMM. L.J. 243,292 (2005) (intemal citations omitted).
128. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
129. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853, para.
1 (2005) [hereinafter DSL Ruling]; Marilyn Geewax, Bells Win Ruling on DSL Service,
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 6, 2005, at IF.
130. TURNER, supra note 121, at 17. The fact that telecommunications firms did not
immediately abandon existing agreements is probably related to the political salience of
network neutrality. At least one prominent proponent of network neutrality mandates has
conceded that anticompetitive behavior has not occurred to date primarily due to the threat
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historically imposed more restrictions on consumers' use of broadband
connections, 131 this deregulation also escalates the likelihood that DSL
operators will engage in similar discrimination.
B. Regional Market Concentration Matters
High-value Web sites are increasingly dependant on broadband
service from regional cable and telecommunications duopolies. In its home
territories, this gives AT&T real market leverage to reshape the Internet
content and services markets. If superimposed into different contexts, Ed
Whitacre's schemes to create vertical partnerships would not be
problematic. Ten years ago, when dialup was king and the ISP business
was fiercely competitive, America Online ("AOL") discovered that it had
no power to demand that its users stay within an AOL-constructed "walled
garden" of affiliated content. Competitive pressure forced them to change
their business model, permitting access to the entire World Wide Web
while providing valuable content and "a friendly destination for Internet
newbies and parents concerned about protecting the little ones in
cyberspace. ' 132 Many experienced Internet users have generally concluded
that AOL's package of exclusive content is highly substitutable and adds
little value relative to basic connectivity. This vertical integration was
certainly beneficial for AOL and its partners, but AOL's partners and users
could make plenty of use of the Internet without AOL's permission-at the
fastest connection speeds, nonetheless. In a competitive market, AOL was
powerless to demand fees from Internet companies. Likewise, Texaco has
no power to demand a cut of the automobile industry's profits, blocking
brands of cars from unaffiliated manufacturers or surcharging their drivers.
Like gasoline, Internet access is a homogenous commodity, and if an
Internet provider in a competitive market were to block or degrade access
to certain sites, customers would go elsewhere. But Whitacre himself notes
that he controls one of just two major routes to broadband access in his
territory.133
Imagine that Texaco and BP are the only two gasoline suppliers in a
large, isolated state, each operating some of its stores in large swathes in
which the other has no presence. In those circumstances, the threat of
of legislation. See Felten, supra note 114.
131. See Wu, supra note 84, at 157.
132. Edward C. Baig, AOL Subscribers: Stay and Pay, or Flee and Get Content Free?,
USA TODAY, July 6, 2005, at 3B, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/
edwardbaig/2005-07-06-aol-stay-or-gox.htm.
133. Again, cable BSPs are not, and soon DSL BSPs will not be, required to interconnect
with other would-be broadband providers as common carriers. See DSL Ruling, supra note
129. This lack of common carrier regulation permits infrastructure providers to price other
BSPs out of existence.
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anticompetitive behavior is more than idle speculation. Texaco and BP
would probably raise consumer prices and extract excess profits. If the
gasoline industry was controlled by several regional duopolies, however,
they might also seek to force automobile manufacturers into making
additional payments. This scenario is far-fetched for competitive
commodities markets, but it is a close analog to the tiering scheme
proposed by Whitacre and other BSP executives, a scheme that could work
in duopolistic end-user broadband market.
Yoo portrays a broadband market where "...concentration levels fall
short of those traditionally associated with anticompetitive concern."
134
Elsewhere in the same article, however, Yoo expects customer choice-
which is inherently regional-to stop anticompetitive behavior. "If a
sufficient number of competitive options exist, any attempt to use
exclusivity in an anticompetitive manner should be disciplined by the
market over the long run, as end users who dislike the exclusivity
arrangement will simply transfer their subscriptions to a different
network." 135 Here, Yoo ignores clear evidence that the typical broadband
market offers one or two choices for home broadband service. The cable-
DSL duopoly share of the broadband market has grown from 94.5 percent
in 1999 to 97.5 percent in 2004.136 This leaves customers with little
recourse even in light of egregious customer service,13 7 let alone broadband
discrimination.
Even if customers cannot go elsewhere, Yoo claims that it does not
really matter to companies like Yahoo! and Amazon. He contends:
[A]pplication and content providers care about the total number of
users they can reach. So long as their total potential customer base is
sufficiently large, it does not really matter whether they are able to
reach users in any particular city. This point is well illustrated by a
series of recent decisions regarding the market for cable television
programming. As the FCC and the D.C. Circuit recognized, a
television programmer's viability does not depend on its ability to
reach viewers in any particular localities, but rather on the total
134. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1892.
135. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1899.
136. TURNER, supra note 121, at 12.
137. See TURNER, supra note 121, at 17. I personally suffered three weeks without a dial
tone and three weeks without DSL in the summer of 2005. After dozens of hours speaking
with Verizon customer service representatives and supervisors and no less than five no-
show service appointments, I filed a written complaint with the Pennsylvania Public
Utilities Commission. Miraculously, my service was restored within days. An informal
survey of friends, colleagues, and consumer-review Web sites led me to believe that I would
receive even worse service at the hands of any of Verizon's competitors---even in the
relatively competitive Philadelphia market. If well-informed customers in densely populated
cities begrudgingly stick with a company because there is no better alternative, the industry
in question is far from competitive.
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number of viewers it is able to reach nationwide.... This in turn
implies tlha the relevant geographic market is a national one, not a
local one.
The emphasis on national rather than regional market share is highly
problematic. Not all Internet content providers care primarily about
national market share. Several prominent regional Web sites exist within
the boundaries of any given regional Bell or cable company; giving those
broadband providers the power to choke off some of the most lucrative
customers would cripple these sites. Most daily newspaper Web sites, for
instance, are of little interest to a broader national audience and could
easily lose a substantial portion of their most lucrative audiences at
Whitacre's whim.
Yoo also underestimates the destructive threat that losing even a
sizable minority of the national audience represents for application and
Web site developers. The computer industry is rife with network
externalities, or changes "in the benefit, or surplus, that an agent derives
from a good when the number of other agents consuming the same kind of
good changes."' 39 In other words, the computer industry is filled with
applications (e.g., Microsoft Office, Adobe Photoshop) and networking
systems (e.g., eBay, AOL Instant Messenger, MySpace) that become more
valuable to users as other users join. This creates successions of "serial"
monopolies in each application or service type. 14 1 Once enough users
decide to use such an application or service, it enjoys near-monopoly status
for years and new competitors face a steep uphill climb, substantially
undermining Yoo's claim that the market for applications and content is of
no competitive concern. 142 Even if AT&T or Verizon controls only a
substantive fraction of the national broadband audience, this may be
enough to decide who does--or does not--enjoy short-term success as the
serial monopolist of the day. In this context, exclusivity arrangements are
particularly likely to have anticompetitive implications and should
therefore be prohibited. The FCC recognized as much in the AOL-Time
Warner case, and this economic theory "seems well within the confines of
antitrust in the new economy."' 143 This is just another reason why even
some regional discrimination is economically and socially undesirable.
138. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1892-93.
139. S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externalities (Effects), http://www.
utdallas.edu/-liebowit/palgrave/network.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
140. See Gerald R. Faulhaber, Case 18: Access and Network Effects in the "New
Economy": AOL-Time Warner (2000), in JOHN E. KwoKA, JR. & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE
ANTITRUST REvOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY, at 453-75 (4th ed. 2004).
141. See id. at 472.
142. See Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 16-17.
143. Faulhaber, supra note 140, at 473.
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C. The Cable Television Precedent
As part of Yoo's argument for measuring concentration based on the
national broadband market, he draws an analogy with cable television. The
economic and legal evidence, however, suggests the value of greater rather
than weaker government protection of diversity.
Yoo makes quite an unsound economic comparison by lumping
Internet content with cable networks. Cable networks are almost all for-
profit enterprises, and they are in such short sup ly that they can demand
licensing fees from cable and satellite systems. In contrast, due to the
very low cost of production and distribution relative to other media,
millions of people have created online content of nearly every imaginable
variety, and virtually every offline media outlet also has an online media
presence. So much content is available online that most information
producers put content online with no expectation to directly profit from
their online presence.
The remarkably low cost of Internet production puts it within the
reach of most Americans, skill permitting. A personal Web site costs less
than four dollars per month to host; in many cases, Web hosting space is
included with a broadband subscription. Millions of people, including
people who otherwise produce and distribute no media, host Web sites for
fun, for self-expression, or for some higher social purpose. Much of it is for
vanity and amusement, but tens of thousands of gifted artists, seasoned
experts, and enthusiastic hobbyists post irrefutably valuable content.
Including both the fun and the serious reasons to love the Internet, these
millions of hours of unpaid labor add incalculable value to our economy,
not to mention our enjoyment of life and our democracy. 145 In many
endeavors, the dream of nearly frictionless transactions has been
leapfrogged by the reality of nearly costless transactions and an entire
subeconomy of "peer production and sharing."'
146
Adding even a small amount to the cost of these millions of
nonmarket actors' participation would cause more deadweight losses.
Slowing or blocking their Web sites would likewise diminish their
willingness to devote their time and energy to building the value of the
network for no compensation, again piling up deadweight losses. Yoo
supports the attempt by BSPs to capture all of the marginal value of
144. See, e.g., JOURNALISM.ORG, AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM, CABLE
TV: ECONOMICS (2005), http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2005/narrativecabletveconomics.
asp?cat=4&media=5.
145. See generally, YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
146. Id. at 59.
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increases in the worth of their networks, 147 but a great deal of this value is
produced for no direct economic gain. If BSPs attempt to capture the
positive value of things that are not being bought or sold, they will kill the
goose that laid the golden egg--or at least seriously reduce her golden egg
production.
Yoo's comparison between Internet content and cable television
networks is also of highly dubious legal merit. He cites Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC148 in contending that a network's ability to reach
a substantive national audience is all that matters. Yet applying this case to
a rebuttal of network neutrality is misguided. First, as the Time Warner
court notes, communication policy has long been sensitive of the need to
ensure media diversity:
Statutory authority flows plainly from the instruction that the
Commission's regulations "ensure that no cable operator or group of
cable operators can unfairly impede, either because of the size of any
individual operator or because of joint actions of operators of
sufficient size, the flow of X~deo programming from the video
programmer to the consumer."
Yoo leans on the FCC ruling in this case to argue that, so long as content
providers can reach a sizable national audience local acts of discrimination
should not be problematic. 5 0 Yet the statute on which the court relies
comes to almost exactly the opposite conclusion, demanding that no cable
system provide preferential treatment to networks in which the cable
system has a stake. Specifically, it requires that the FCC "ensure that cable
operators affiliated with video programmers do not favor such
programmers in determining carriage on their cable systems or do not
unreasonably restrict the flow of the video programming of such
programmers to other video distributors."'
152
Yoo is defending a broadband policy that takes the exact opposite
stance, permitting network owners to discriminate in favor of affiliated
content. Here, as in other cases, the federal government can be, should be,
and is even more vigilant against anticompetitive exclusion than in
nonmedia industries. Especially considering the substantial First
Amendment value in allowing nearly every citizen to speak in an equitable
147. See Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1888-89.
148. See generally 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
149. Id. at 1131 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(2)(A) (2000)).
150. See Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1892. "As the FCC and the D.C. Circuit
recognized, a television programmer's viability does not depend on its ability to reach
viewers in any particular cities, but rather on the total number of viewers it is able to reach
nationwide." Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1892.
151. See 47 U.S.C. § 533(f) (2000).
152. Id. at § 533(f)(2)(B).
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forum to whomever will listen, preserving network neutrality makes as
much legal as economic sense.
D. New Technologies Are Improbable Solutions
Nearly all commentators on all sides of the network neutrality debate
would love to see the mainstream success of a third technology, or a "third
pipe," to deliver broadband to the home. Wireless technologies such as
WiFi (802.11), long-distance wireless broadband ("WiMax") (802.16), and
cellular broadband technologies have many people hopeful that new
entrants will bypass the last-mile bottleneck currently dominated by DSL
and cable. The wireless hype received an injection in August 2006, when
Sprint Nextel announced it would invest up to $3 billion to deploy a
WiMax network in major metropolitan areas throughout the U.S.133 The
Wall Street Journal, which opposes network neutrality mandates, quickly
seized on the news to insist that competition is just around the comer and,
therefore, network neutrality is unnecessary.15 4 The editorial incorrectly
implies Sprint will deploy its WiMax network in the unlicensed band of
spectrum; Sprint will actually use licensed spectrum for which it has paid
handsomely. Protocol-compliant WiMax technology is actually designed
for licensed spectrum, 155 which illustrates a substantial barrier to new
market entry. The spectrum alone cost Sprint billions, and it only covers
one-third of the U.S. population. 156 WiMax is also a largely unproven
technology, and most services "apply the 'pre-standard' euphemism, which
is great unless you expect things to work together. Or expect economies of
scale in equipment building."'157 Further, "in terms of dollars per bit, it has
to be more expensive than DSL or cable modems, so don't look for a
pricing breakthrough." 1
58
Sprint's plan to blanket major metropolitan areas with wireless
coverage based on unproven technology starting in late 2007-an
ambitious plan that is still on the drawing board-is hardly the same as a
guarantee that typical homes will have three affordable and reliable
153. See, e.g., Paul Taylor, Sprint Nextel to Invest $3b in "4G" Network, FIN. TIMES, US
Ed., Aug. 9, 2006, at 15.
154. See Wi-Fi to the Max, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2006, at A10.
155. See Glenn Fleishman, Fundamentally, WiMax is Meant for Licensed Bands, Wi-Fi
NET NEWS, Aug. 8, 2006, http://wifinetnews.com/archives/006846.html.
156. Posting of Mike, WiMax, Net Neutrality and Basic Factchecking, TECHDIRT,
http://techdirt.com/articles/20060809/1149258.shtml (Aug. 9, 2006, 12:02 EST).
157. WSJ Wrong on WiMAX-And Neutrality, http://paulsblog.pulver.com/archives/20
06/08/wsjwrongonwi.html (Aug. 9, 2006, 13:09 EST).
158. Robert X. Cringely, Bound and Gagged: WiMax Isn't What It Seems, But Then
Nothing Else Is, Either, I, CRINGELY, July 6, 2006, http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/2006/
pulpit_20060706_000349.html.
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broadband choices in the near future. Even if they did, the nation's ecstatic
embrace of merely a third major entrant will only be joyous in comparison
to the broadband duopoly of today. Three companies in a market will still
enjoy power over price and service, 159 permitting companies to continue
some degree of profiteering via broadband discrimination, and that is under
the Wall Street Journal's optimistic assumption that the Sprint WiMax
network succeeds. Most ex-urban, small-city, and rural customers are still
not even on the drawing board for receiving a third truly competitive
broadband pipe, let alone meaningful broadband competition.
The remaining wireless solutions are also not likely to provide truly
nationwide third-pipe solutions. "Mesh WiFi so far has had a lot of
problems scaling. Cellular 3G networks are cutting off any user who uses
the system for real broadband uses and satellite broadband remains a joke
in comparison to other broadband systems."'160 WiFi may be the technology
with the most real promise. In 2004, for instance, several teenage
attendants at the DefCon hacker conference established a WiFi connection
at a distance of 55 miles with the aid of a nine-and-a-half foot satellite
dish. 16 1 Google plans to blanket San Francisco with a mesh WiFi network,
and several cities, including Philadelphia and Boston, are planning to
deploy municipal wireless networks. 62Yet there are several obstacles to
mass WiFi coverage. First, incumbent BSPs have tried to legislate the
problem away. Following Philadelphia's announcement that it would
blanket the city with WiFi, Verizon successfully pushed for a Pennsylvania
law that threatens the ability of other municipalities to get wireless projects
off the ground. 16 3 States including Florida, Texas, and Virginia have since
passed similar laws. 164 The Stevens Bill would ban such state laws,
expediting municipal provision of wireless broadband, 16 5 though the House
159. As noted above, even if all three competitors have one-third market share (33
points), the market's HHI score is 3267, nearly double the "highly concentrated" threshold
of 1800.
160. See Posting of Mike, supra note 156.
161. See Kim Zetter, Wi-Fi Shootout in the Desert, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 3, 2004,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0, 1284,64440,00.html.
162. See Robert Weisman, Hub Sets Citywide WiFi Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2006,
at Al.
163. See Matt Richtel, Pennsylvania Limits Cities in Offering Net Access, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2004, at C6.
164. Declan McCullagh & Anne Broache, Senate moves to ease municipal Wi-Fi,
ZDNET NEWS, June 29, 2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-6089345.html.
165. See S. 2686, supra note 15, at § 502. The bill does require municipalities to offer
private contractors thirty days to bid on the right to build a system with the same or lower
user fees. Id. Yet communities still have wide latitude in determining pricing, service, and
other details, and private sector companies only win the contract if their bid is determined to
meet the municipality's specifications by a third party of the municipality's choosing.
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version has no similar provision. Even if the clause becomes law, the cost
of deploying such networks will likely deter most municipalities and
companies from deploying wireless in the near future, and it will be most
economical to deploy in the most densely populated cities with the lowest
need for additional broadband suppliers. As with Sprint's WiMax network,
municipal WiFi will remain out of reach for a sizable majority of the U.S.
for the foreseeable future.
V. AD Hoc REGULATION IS INADEQUATE
In light of admittedly problematic discrimination, as in the Madison
River case, Yoo suggests targeted FCC regulations to punish the worst
instances of discrimination. 166  Others might argue that antitrust
enforcement would provide an adequate remedy, but both Yoo 16 7 and
James B. Speta, who strongly supports neutrality, conclude that antitrust
regulation is inadequate. 1  Especially in the rapidly evolving market of
online content and services, antitrust enforcement is far too slow a remedy
for anticompetitive behavior to save embattled products. In 2003, Microsoft
paid $750 million in cash to settle the antitrust case brought by
Netscape. 17 By that time, however, Netscape had slid from the dominant
browser by which users accessed the Web to a distant memory, long since
stomped out of existence by Microsoft's decision to embed Internet
Explorer into Windows.171
If it is to keep affected products from sliding into oblivion, any
network neutrality regulation should go through the FCC. The Commission
can regulate either in an ad hoc fashion or by enforcing a generalized
regime of neutrality, especially one backed by new legislation. In this
section, I argue ad hoc regulation, especially as set out in H.R. 5252, is
inadequate.
Despite Yoo's enthusiasm for the Madison River case, the case is
actually a fine example of the inadequacy of ad hoc regulation under the
Commission's current statutory authority. Madison River is a
telecommunications company, so blocking VolP traffic preserves their long
distance telephone business. The two newly implicated companies,
166. See Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1900.
167. See Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 69-70.
168. See Speta, supra note 81, at 17-21.
169. See also Harold Feld, Why Antitrust Doesn't Cut It for NN (But Why Google Has to
Pretend), PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, July 5, 2006, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/511.
170. Andrew Beach, Microsoft Settles Internet Feud, THE SCOTSMAN, May 31, 2003, at
21.
171. See Alex Fryer, Settlement's Impact Challenged: Little Has Changed, Critics Tell
Appeals Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2003, at El.
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however, are recent entrants into the voice telephony game, to say the least.
The first company accused by Vonage is Clearwire, a company that sells
WiMax 172 in a handful of states. Clearwire reached an exclusivity
agreement in March of 2005 with Bell Canada to provide Internet
telephony over its networks. 173 The other is an unnamed cable company,
which was allegedly still successfully interfering with VolP traffic a month• • 174
after the Madison River settlement. Cable companies are increasingly
becoming players in the VolP market, 175 giving them an incentive to
degrade or cut off VolP service from their competitors. In other words, a
BSP does not need to be a traditional phone company to have an incentive
to block VoP traffic; the desire to be the only VoIP provider on their
broadband networks is incentive enough.
These companies clearly fail to meet Yoo's test for targeted
intervention, in which "a broadband provider bars access to an Internet
application that competes directly with its core business."' 176 Rather, these
incumbent BSPs seek to extend their market power in the broadband
business to capture potential rents in profitable adjacent markets. Even the
potential for such rent-seeking is a deterrent to the investment in and
development of innovative online applications. 177  The continued
discrimination against VoIP traffic by companies that are not themselves
telephone companies shows the potential for such rent-seeking in markets
that are new to a given BSP; the list of such markets will only grow.
Second, consider the utter failure of the Madison River settlement to
deter these BSPs from obstructing Vonage's calls for competitive reasons.
At least one online commentator believed that Clearwire's VolP
certification program was an excuse to continue to block or degrade voice
172. For a background on WiMAX, see generally About the WiMAX Forum, WIMAX
FORUM, http://www.wimaxforum.org/about (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
173. Bernard Simon, Canadian Telecoms Rivals Agree Wireless Venture, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2005, at 27.
174. Charny, supra note 90.
175. Marguerite Reardon, Cable Goes for the Quadruple Play, CNET NEWS.COM, Nov.
7, 2005, http://news.com.com/Cable+goes+for+the+quadruple+play/2100-1034_3-5933340.
html.
176. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1899.
177. Ex parte, supra note 38, at 3-5. The authors argue:
A network that is as neutral as possible is predictable: all applications are treated
alike. Since the Commission wants to maximize the incentives to invest in
broadband applications, it should act now to eliminate the unpredictability created
by potential future restrictions on network usage.
The value of network neutrality can be seen clearly in another context: the
nation's electric system. Because it remains neutral, the electricity network has
served as an important platform for innovation.
Ex parte, supra note 38, at 3.
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traffic from competitors, 178 a credible claim since Vonage appears to have
gotten its voice data through by hiding it from Clearwire. Vonage has
not brought complaints to the FCC over these two latest incidents, though
this may be due to a fear of setting an unfavorable precedent:
Since Clearwire is not a traditional telephone service provider, it is
unclear what, if any, legal recourse Vonage might have. In fact,
Clearwire's terms of service claim that its service is "not a telephone
service," and as such may limit users' "rights of redress before federal,
state or local telecommunications regulatory agencies.
Unlike telephone companies such as Madison River, WiMax and cable
companies fall into the relatively unregulated category of "information
services" providers and are therefore not subject to common carrier
regulations. 18 1 The FCC therefore has doubtful authority to resolve these
cases.
This example alone demonstrates at least the continued potential for
discrimination, which serves as a deterrent to investment in online
innovation, even if actual discrimination remains rare. Without a
generalized norm of a stable platform for innovation, provided so well by
the electric grid, for instance, 182 planning and investment is less rational.
The diminished potential for online innovations that improve our collective
welfare is an excellent example of a market failure that warrants statutory
and regulatory intervention. Since unpredictability is a key element of that
failure, a principled regulatory stance is a key part of the solution.
The neutrality language in H.R. 5252 exacerbates, rather than quells,
the air of uncertainty around online innovation. On August 5, 2005, the
FCC adopted a Broadband Policy Statement 183 in which the FCC adopted
the following principles:
- To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.
178. See Posting by Carlo, Clearwire To VolP Providers: Get Certified Or, Oops, You
Might Get Blocked, TECHDIRT, (Sept. 21, 2005, 21:28 EST), http://www.techdirt.com/article
s/20050921/2128243_F.shtml.
179. Posting by Mike, Getting Around Blocks By Playing Packet Hide and Seek,
TECHDIRT, (Apr. 22, 2005, 09:48 EST), http://techdirt.com/articles/20050422/0946236_F.sht
ml.
180. Kapustka, supra note 94, at para. 13.
181. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, at
paras. 33-71 (2002); Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967 (2005).
182. See Ex parte, supra note 38, at 3.
183. See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986 (2005), available at http://www.publicknow
ledge.org/pdf/FCC-05-15 lAl .pdf [hereinafter Broadband Policy Statement].
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• To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to
the needs of law enforcement.
- To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the
network.
- To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the
open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are
entitled to competition among network 4 providers, application and
service providers, and content providers.
Yet, as neutrality Aroponents in the House note in their dissent from the
committee report, i 5 the policy statement:
is a broadly-worded, imprecise statement of "feel-good" rhetoric
intended to guide future agency decision-making but not, as the FCC
Chairman indicated, to result in any enforceable protections or specific
behavior requirements. It was not adopted subject to the thoroughness
of the Administrative Procedures Act's (APA) notice-and-comment
process. It was not adopted with any notion of enforcement attached to
it. In essence, the COPE Act requires the FCC to enforce something
that is of highly dubious enforceability.
As the dissenting representatives note, the fourth FCC principle is
particularly illustrative of this problem. The principle may state that
consumers are entitled to competition, but it provides no specifics
whatsoever regarding implementation. "How does the FCC enforce that?
How can an entity be justly found in violation of that? Competition across
all markets is a noble aspiration, but can the lack of it legitimately lead to
FCC fines? Simply directing the FCC to enforce this statement may prove,,187
unworkable. Empirically, even clear and simple ad hoc regulation such
as in the Madison River case is likely less than effective. The bill's
mandate that the FCC impose four highly ambiguous policy statements on
an ad hoc basis, without the power to create clear principles of
implementation, is an obvious attempt to create the illusion of addressing
concerns of discrimination while weakening the hand of the very agency
that would be entrusted with enforcement.
184. Id. at para. 4 (internal citations omitted).
185. H.R. REP. No. 109-470, pt. 1, at 53 et seq. Dissenting Representatives include the
Honorable: John D. Dingell, Henry A. Waxman, Edward J. Markey, Anna G. Eshoo, Lois






Under S. 2917, 1 8 sponsored by Senators Olympia Snowe and Byron
Dorgan, the FCC would be tasked with enforcing meaningful network
neutrality mandates. The bill would require that broadband companies
generally treat all data equally:
(a) Duty of Broadband Service Providers.-With respect to any
broadband service offered to the public, each broadband service
provider shall-
(1) not block, interfere with, discriminate against, impair, or degrade
the ability of any person to use a broadband service to access, use,
send, post, receive, or offer any lawful content, application, or service
made available via the Internet;
(2) not prevent or obstruct a user from attaching or using any device to
the network of such broadband service provider, only if such device
does not physically damage or substantially degrade the use of such
network by other subscribers;
(3) provide and make available to each user information about such
user's access to the Internet, and the speed, nature, and limitations of
such user's broadband service;
(4) enable any content, application, or service made available via the
Internet to be offered, provided, or posted on a basis that-
(A) is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, including with respect to
quality of service, access, speed, and bandwidth;
(B) is at least equivalent to the access, speed, quality of service, and
bandwidth that such broadband service provider offers to affiliated
content, applications, or services made available via the public Internet
into the network of such broadband service provider; and
(C) does not impose a charge on the basis of the type of content,
applications, or services made available via the Internet into the
network of such broadband service provider;
(5) only prioritize content, applications, or services accessed by a user
that is made available via the Internet within the network of such
broadband service provider based on the type of content, applications,
or services and the level of service purchased by the user, without
charge for such prioritization; and
(6) not install or utilize network features, funciwi s, or capabilities that
impede or hinder compliance with this section.
The bill contains a list of reasonable exemptions. BSPs can still protect
their networks and the safety of end-users' computers 190 and offer optional
consumer protection services such as anti-spain and parental controls.
1 9 1
They can still charge different prices for different levels of service,
188. See S. 2917, supra note 16.
189. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(a).
190. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(b)(1).
191. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(b)(3).
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measured by either data transmission speeds or by total amount of data
used per billing period. 192 BSPs can still enforce their terms of service
193
and prevent breaches of the law. 194 The bill requires the FCC to establish a
mechanism for any aggrieved person to file a formal. complaint, and the
Commission generally must resolve these claims within ninety days. 195 In
addition to other remedies under Title V of the Communications Act of
1934,196 the FCC can order violators to cease discrimination and to pay
damages to a complaining party. 1
97
I would offer just two minor improvements by way of clarification.
First, the bill is reasonably clear but could be more explicit so that the
prohibition on broadband discrimination applies only to last-mile BSPs and
not to intermediate transmission facilities, where the market is highly
competitive and, due to packet-switching, very unlikely to lead to
bottlenecks. It may be the case that, for some services, content or
application discrimination is necessary; but senders and receivers should be
able to choose freely among intermediate service providers or choose not to
use such services. Second, the bill should add an additional clarification for
establishments such as schools, libraries, government buildings, and
Internet cafes that provide Internet service via computer terminals that are
owned by the establishment. In the bill's current exemption permitting
BSPs to offer "consumer protection services" such as anti-spam and
content filtering software, BSPs are required to offer such services with the
proviso that end-users may opt out. In the case of establishments
offering patrons access to the Internet on establishment-provided
computers, the owner of the computer-not the user-should be able to
choose whether or not such software is optional. These are minor
clarifications, however, and the bill is fundamentally sound as it stands.
Whether added as an amendment to broader telecommunications
reform or passed on its own, S. 2917 would preserve the norm of network
neutrality, perpetuating a degree of predictability that would greatly
facilitate online innovation, and BSPs would be prevented from censoring
speech with which they disagree. Network administrators would still be
permitted to prevent harmful activity, comply with legal duties, and
neutrally manage bandwidth. Network engineers could still design
networks to cope with congestion or to speed up service, for instance,
192. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(b)(2).
193. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(b)(4).
194. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(b)(5).
195. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(e).
196. 47 U.S.C. § 501 etseq. (2006).
197. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(0.
198. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(b)(3).
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prioritizing older packets over newer ones, undermining claims that the
Internet is not exactly neutral today and that non-neutral engineering is
necessary for network management. BSPs could even offer differentiated
products at different prices, charging more for connections with higher
average, peak, or minimum throughputs or for greater net usage per billing
period.
Considering the deep, abiding constitutional and economic values that
flourish under a neutrality regime, it would take persuasive counter-
arguments to dissuade most from agreeing that this regime would be a good
idea-at least in a market as concentrated as the broadband market. I next
turn to the alleged disadvantages: network congestion, lack of network
diversity, and regulatory malfeasance.
VII. REBUTTING COUNTER-ARGUMENTS
A. Network Congestion
The supposed inability of BSPs to effectively manage network
congestion is the first of Yoo's two major objections to a neutrality
mandate. Even if congestion is a problem, or becomes one, 199 it is more
cost-effective to add more bandwidth than it is to discriminate in the
middle of the network.20 Even if additional bandwidth is insufficient or
199. Neutrality opponents are probably overstating the extent of congestion in opposing
mandated neutrality. The application most cited as needing consistent, speedy real-time
delivery is VoIP. Yet Felten, supra note 93, concludes that current broadband speeds
generally have enough bandwidth to support VolP. Id.
200. Farhad Manjoo, The Corporate Toll on the Internet, SALON.COM, Apr. 17, 2006,
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2006/04/l 7/toll/index_np.html. Manjoo explains:
Gary Bachula, vice president for external affairs of Interet2, a nonprofit project
by universities and corporations to build an extremely fast and large network,
argues that managing online traffic just doesn't work very well. At the February
Senate hearing, he testified that when Intemet2 began setting up its large network,
called Abilene, "our engineers started with the assumption that we should find
technical ways of prioritizing certain kinds of bits, such as streaming video, or
video conferencing, in order to assure that they arrive without delay. As it
developed, though, all of our research and practical experience supported the
conclusion that it was far more cost effective to simply provide more bandwidth.
With enough bandwidth in the network, there is no congestion and video bits do
not need preferential treatment."
Today, Bachula continued, "our Abilene network does not give preferential
treatment to anyone's bits, but our users routinely experiment with streaming
HDTV, hold thousands of high-quality two-way videoconferences simultaneously,
and transfer huge files of scientific data around the globe without loss of packets."
Id. Of course, BSPs may nonetheless wish to implement a less cost-effective, non-neutral
solution in order to create a new revenue model based on broadband discrimination.
Relative to an upgrade in bandwidth, BSPs will spend more to manage congestion via
packet discrimination, but that service will be of less net economic value than one into
which the same capital had been spent upgrading bandwidth. Yoo is thus defending an
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cannot be deployed in time to outpace demand, network neutrality is still
warranted because BSPs can better manage bandwidth via content-neutral
measures of speed of service provided or actual bits used, including
maximum speed, minimum speed, and total bandwidth used per billing
cycle.
Yoo acknowledges that managing bandwidth congestion is ideally
done via usage-sensitive pricing, but he notes that transaction costs may
render this option impractical. 21 He suggests that the problem of
transaction costs may explain flat-rate local telephone pricing in the
U.S.,z20 but he later acknowledges that "the persistence of usage-based
pricing of local telephone service in other countries raises questions of the
universality of the benefits of flat-rate pricing.''z 3 He also suggests,
without citing any literature, that transaction costs-as opposed to, say,
consumer demand for predictable billing-have led cellular telephone
• • 204
carriers to move away from usage-sensitive pricing. Based on the mere
possibility that transaction costs could prohibit the efficient metering of
bandwidth, Yoo would permit BSPs to manage congestion by
discriminating based on the type of application used or content
transmitted.
2 05
The argument for congestion management via application
discrimination is riddled with holes. First, Yoo never quantifies the expense
of bandwidth metering-an ironic failure from a scholar who expects his
opponents to quantify a trade-off in political values. He cites no networking
literature to hint that metering is cumbersome. Considering that BSPs
already log their users' Web activities, this claim requires empirical
support. Second, even if the analogy with telephone metering holds,
telephone companies continue to bill by the minute for long distance and to
offer plans with cost-per-call rather than flat-rate local calling. Nearly all
cellular providers meter each and every call during peak weekday minutes,
billing for peak minutes that exceed a user's pre-purchased allotment-a
reasonable business model if BSPs are truly facing a congestion crisis.
economically inefficient business path resulting in substantial deadweight losses.
201. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1865-72.
202. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1868.
203. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1870.
204. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1870. This argument muddles the distinction
between buying tiers of bundled minutes, which still requires accurate metering, and buying
unlimited access, as happens with local landline calling in the U.S. There is therefore no
likely relationship between transaction costs and changing pricing models for cellular calls.
Nearly all carriers still carefully meter both peak and off-peak minutes for each customer,
even providing customers with online and handset-based means of checking their current
minute usage.
205 Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1879-83.
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Third, coping with congestion by throttling new technologies retards
technological progress. Mandated neutrality for telephone users remained a
good idea despite the "unfair" network burden created by dial-up Internet
users. If Yoo's reasoning had ruled the day fifteen years ago, telephone
companies would have been permitted to reduce network congestion by
discriminating against dial-up ISP numbers, seeking monopoly rents from
Internet-using customers.206 The deadweight losses would have radically
reduced Internet use, so much so that Internet use and online innovation
would have been substantially lower than they have been to date. The new
technology would barely have gotten off the ground if the gatekeepers of
the old technology on which it was built had taxed it at a rate of their
choosing. The Bells' real business motive may have been to profit
handsomely from others' innovations, but their rhetoric would have been
about managing telephone network congestion.
Yoo does, however, acknowledge that metering costs may not be
prohibitive; if they are not, then network restrictions are unwarranted.
"This is not to say that all deviations from network neutrality will
invariably be innocent. Indeed, under my approach such restrictions would
not be justified when the transaction costs of metering bandwidth usage are
relatively low.' 207 Both Yoo and neutrality proponents believe that a
metered regime is preferable to one that throttles or surcharges specific
applications. Payments should ideally reflect objective measures of
bandwidth, based on total bandwidth use and/or download/upload speeds.
Maximum speed is a good substitute for total use-much more so than
application-specific port blocking. Application-specific blocks can be
creatively engineered around; in at least one instance, Vonage was able to
get its traffic around a BSP's apparent attempt to block its traffic simply by
using other ports. 208 In contrast, instant bandwidth capacity is an effective
means of price discrimination:
[S]ervice providers can keep endlessly upgrading their customers'
connections, and use increasing speeds as a market segmentation
device. The significance of the low utilization of data networks. . . is
that what matters to users is not getting lots of bits, but getting a
206. Yoo would object to this characterization, at least in part; he insists that the era of
healthy broadband competition is upon us and we therefore need not bother with legal
precedents set in the era of RBOC monopolies. See Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at
1878-79. Recall from above, however, that local broadband markets are anything but
competitive. See supra, Part IV. Yoo's hypothetical objection would therefore need to
explain why a near-total broadband duopoly is sufficiently different from total monopoly to
guarantee that the next "unfair," revolutionary use of networking resources is permitted to
thrive without threat of discrimination.
207. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1899.
208. Mark Sullivan, Vonage Hits ISP Resistance, LIGHT READING, Mar. 30, 2005,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc-id=71020&site=lightreading.
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moderate amount of bits quickly, in other words low transaction
latency.
Network owners already can and do price discriminate based on maximum
speed and/or total per-month usage. Maximum download speed is the most
common basis for price discrimination. Verizon offers DSL service at two
tiers of connection speeds, 2 1 as does AT&T.2 1 1 Verizon has also deployed
fiber optic networking in limited areas, featuring three tiers of download
speeds at prices starting at $34.95 per month,212 for a total of five Verizon
tiers.
As Odlyzko argues, networks are generally underutilized; 2 13 the
problem is, therefore, not total bandwidth use but congestion during online
rush hours. In dealing with this problem, charging more for a higher
maximum or higher minimum is a more effective means of allocating
scarce bandwidth based on willingness to pay; higher-cost connections
generally deliver higher throughput during both rush hour and down times.
Yet even if total bandwidth use matters greatly, network congestion can be
and is managed along those lines as well. Several BSPs, especially cable
companies, enforce caps on the total bandwidth usage per billing period.
Cox Communications, for instance, provides three tiers of service that
distinguish users based on instant bandwidth and total per-month usage.214
While Comcast is less explicit with their customers, they also enforce caps
on end-users' total bandwidth. The trouble of monitoring total bandwidth
cannot be beyond the budgets of many BSPs; University of Connecticut
students who live in the residence halls are subject to caps of seven
gigabytes of total per-week bandwidth usage on their residential TI
lines. These are profoundly captive "customers" whose service fees are
built into their boarding charges. The school could block specific
applications such as peer-to-peer applications with little economic loss, yet
they find it perfectly feasible to enforce reasonable network usage via a
209. Odlyzko specifically lectures BSPs for mistakenly seeking to create vertically
integrated streaming media centers when ever-faster broadband pipes serve the clearest
route to finely detailed price discrimination. Odlyzko, supra note 43, at 28.
210. See Verizon, Packages and Prices, http://www22.verizon.com/ForHomeDSLU
channels/dsl/packages/default.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
211. See AT&T, Internet Services, https://swot.sbc.com/swot/dslMassMarket
Catalog.do?do--view&serviceType=DYNAMICIP (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
212. See Verizon, Verizon FiOS: Packages and Prices, http://www22.verizon.com/
content/ConsumerFios?LOBCode=C&PromoTCode=DNIO&PromoSrcCode=B&POEId=
TL1HP (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
213. Odlyzko, supra note 43, at 28.
214. See Cox Communications, Limitations of Service, http://www.cox.com/policy/
limitations.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
215. See University of Connecticut, Bandwidth Usage, http://www.security.uconn.edu/
guides/bandwidth.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
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per-week bandwidth cap. If the University of Connecticut can meter
bandwidth, it is certainly feasible for Verizon to do so. Therefore, since
"the transaction costs of metering bandwidth usage are relatively low,
' 216
Yoo's own reasoning leads us to conclude that BSP-imposed limits on
specific applications are unwarranted.
B. Network Diversity
Yoo insists that the Internet of the future may be more innovative if
networking resources are divided into a set of separate functions. He
acknowledges that the norm of the neutral network has caused the
exponential innovation of the recent past, but insists that changes in the
Internet require rethinking neutrality. "Given the Internet's meteoric
success, it is tempting to treat the status quo as the relevant baseline and to
place the burden on those who would deviate from it ... In recent years,
however, the environment in which the Internet operates has changed
radically. ' 217 In light of these changes, Yoo anticipates a plethora of
network designs among last-mile providers, each optimized to a different
niche market:
Indeed, it is conceivable that network diversity might make it possible
for three different last-mile networks to coexist: one optimized for
traditional Intemet applications such as e-mail and website access,
another incorporating security features to facilitate e-commerce and to
guard against viruses and other hostile aspects of Internet life, and a
third that prioritizes packets in the manner needed to f42 iitate time-
sensitive applications such as streaming media and VoIP.
Yet Yoo references little if any technical literature to support this vision of
special purpose last-mile networks. 219 Quite the contrary, one of his
sources, the Blumenthal and Clark piece that describes the Internet's recent
changes, 22 sounds a call to preserve neutrality, not to create multiple,
special-purpose networks. Here is the very last sentence of their article:
"We argue that the open, general nature of the Net, which derived from the
end-to-end arguments, is a valuable characteristic that encourages
216. Yoo, Congestion, supra note 20, at 1899.
217. Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 21 (internal citations omitted).
218. Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 31.
219. Having consulted innumerable online resources and several current or former IT
professionals in preparation for this Article, I have concluded that the vast majority of those
with the technical skills to develop---or even implement-the next great online innovation
support a generalized Internet protocol, and they fear rather than welcome BSP violations of
network neutrality.
220. Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the Internet:
The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET
TECH. 70 (2001).
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innovation, and that this flexibility should be preserved." 221 Blumenthal
and Clark are two of the most established Internet architects and
researchers in history,22 2 and they draw exactly the opposite conclusion as
Yoo, pleading for the preservation of the architectural norm of a generally
neutral Internet.
While supporting neither the legal nor the technical regime described
by Yoo, Blumenthal and Clark do acknowledge that deviations from that
principle can also be useful. "[F]rom the beginning, the end-to-end
arguments revolved around requirements that could be implemented
correctly at the end-points; if implementation inside the network is the only
way to accomplish the requirement, then an end-to-end argument isn't
appropriate in the first place.' 2 23 For instance, the authors note that locally
cached, two-stage delivery via intermediate servers is particularly useful
for streaming media content. 22 Yet the potential benefits of deviations
from the end-to-end principle seminally developed by Saltzer, Reed, and
Clark2 25 do not disprove the value of the neutrality regime proposed by
Snowe and Dorgan. The proposed rules would prevent BSPs from
obstructing nondestructive communications, whether by blocking packets
entirely or relegating them to the slow lane-especially due to a failure to
pay for priority delivery. These rules certainly would not prevent BSPs
from adding additional, useful functionality such as intermediate caching.
The text of the ban itself is clear enough on this point, but Snowe and
Dorgan's first exception is even clearer. It specifically grants network
owners the power to manage their "network in a manner that does not
distinguish based on the source or ownership of content, application, or
service .. ,26 If BSPs want to introduce tools like intermediate caching,
they certainly may do so as long as the tools are open to all senders without
charge.
Blumenthal and Clark believe BSPs, in seeking vertically integrated
business models, are perhaps the single greatest looming threat to online
innovation. "The concern here, however, is that investment in closed
islands of enhanced service, combined with investment in content servers
within each island, decreases the motivation for investment in the
221. Id. at 99.
222. From 1987 to 2003, Blumenthal was Executive Director of the Computer Science
and Telecommunications Board of the National Research Council. Clark is currently a
Senior Research Scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science
and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. From 1981 to 1989, he acted as Chief Protocol
Architect in the development of the Internet and chaired the Internet Activities Board.
223. Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 220, at 80 (internal citation omitted).
224. See Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 220, at 83.
225. See Saltzer et al., supra note 31, at 282-84.
226. S. 2917, supra note 16, at § 2(b)(1).
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alternative of open end-to-end services. Once started down one path of
investment, the alternative may be harder to achieve. ' 227 This sincere fear
rebuts Yoo's reasoning nicely; online innovation will not be fostered, but
rather slowed by any attempt by BSPs to create and market competing
packages of "closed islands" of services. BSPs will have tremendous
incentives to invest in the delivery of content inside their "closed island"
and to neglect their delivery of the general-purpose Internet. Even worse,
this may become a positive feedback loop. The sharper the difference in
quality, the more BSPs can charge online providers for access to the top
tier of delivery; the more they can charge for the right to send information
quickly, the more incentive they have to neglect the general-purpose
Internet.
If this scenario transpires, Yoo insists, inefficient restrictions placed
on network traffic by incumbents will only empower entry by new
BSPs.228 Yet this analysis is seriously flawed for at least two reasons. First,
Yoo incorrectly assumes that new BSPs will enter and succeed due to
unique packages of proprietary content and applications. Yet as Odlyzko
explains:
[T]here is far more money in providing basic connectivity. That is
what people have always valued far more, and have been prepared to
pay more for. (The far greater revenues of cellular carriers in the U.S.
than of cable TV providers is just one example .... ) But while conjgt
delivery does lend itself to a closed network, connectivity does not.
Unlike the NFL Network's ability to boost satellite TV subscriptions,230
AOL has realized exclusive content drives few Internet service
subscriptions and is therefore sharing nearly all of its offerings on the free
Internet in an effort to gain advertising revenue.23
Yoo's prediction of new market entrants also elides two major
barriers to market entry: a substantial first-mover advantage, exacerbated
by substantial sunk costs. If a firm enters a market first, serving as a
monopoly, a second firm faces a substantive disadvantage in entering that
market.22 Because there is far greater money in connectivity, that will
always provide the greatest incentive for new market entrants. Yet the first
227. Blumenthal & Clark, supra note 220, at 73.
228. See Yoo, Beyond, supra note 22, at 48-53.
229. Odlyzko, supra note 43, at 28. While Odlyzko explains why open networks will
tend to win, note that the reasoning discussed in this Article demonstrates why the
exceptions are both common enough and, even when rare, bad enough to warrant
intervention. See discussion, supra Parts I-II.
230. See, e.g., Richard SandonIir, Battling Time Warner, NFL Network Gains Ground,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at D2.
231. See, e.g., AOL Gets the Message, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at B16.
232. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL R. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS (6th Ed.) 447-48
(2005).
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one or two firms in a regional broadband market will already have a vast
majority of the market locked up, even at inefficient prices. Even if we
suppose that broadband is a frictionless commodity market, new entrants
can erode those profits, but they can rarely afford to charge low enough
prices to achieve a market share comparable to that of the current
monopolist.233 The telecommunications market, of course, is far from
frictionless; it involves substantial sunk costs.234 Verizon has already laid
the cables and must only maintain them; a new BSP faces substantial build-
out costs, and Verizon can likely afford to match or beat their prices. This
built-in disincentive to new market entry erodes the potential for new
market entrants to discipline inefficient monopolistic practices. Decades of
bipartisan FCC policymaking recognized this:
Indeed, under both Republican and Democratic Administrations, the
FCC respected the efficiency and possible inevitability of natural
monopoly in the market of physical, fixed wire links to households....
The FCC's goal has routinely been not to insist that competitors
always bypass bottlenecks, such as by building redundant local access,
but instead that bottlenecks be shared where that wou~dbe a means to
the end of competition in services offered to end users.
Yoo's prediction, an immediate future populated by a diverse array of
broadband networks featuring highly customized features and content,
defies both history and accepted economic theory.
C. Better to Wait and See
Several opponents of network neutrality believe that the best
approach is to wait and see. They are genuinely scared of broadband
discrimination, but they would rather regulate after the situation has
evolved further. The alleged disadvantage is that regulating now removes
the chance to create better regulation later, and it accrues the unforeseen
consequences described below.2 36 Felten provides a particularly visible and
eloquent example of this argument. He agrees that neutrality is generally
desirable as an engineering principle, but he wishes the threat of regulation
233. Id. at 448.
234. Jordi Gual, Market Definition in the Telecoms Industry, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC
PoucY RESEARCH, July 2003, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3988.asp. Wireless
transmission potentially involves far fewer sunk costs, but the current structure of spectrum
auctions creates unnecessary sunk costs for much of the available spectrum. See Eli Noam,
Beyond Spectrum Auctions: Taking the next step to open spectrum access, 21 TELECOMM.
POL'Y 461,461 (1997). Standards-compliant WiMax, of the type Sprint intends to deploy, is
built for use in licensed spectrumr. See discussion, supra notes 153-55. Cellular broadband
also operates in licensed frequencies.
235. Reed Hundt, The Ineluctable Modality of Broadband, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 239, 249
(2004).
236. See discussion, infra Part VII.D.
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could indefinitely continue to deter discrimination:
There is a good policy argument in favor of doing nothing and letting
the situation develop further. The present situation, with the network
neutrality issue on the table in Washington but no rules yet adopted, is
in many ways ideal. ISPs, knowing that discriminating now would
make regulation seem more necessary, are on their best behavior; and
with no rules yet adopted we don't have to face the difficult issues of
line-drawing and enforcement. Enacting strong regulation now would
risk side-effects, and passing toothless regulation now would remove
the threat of regulation. If it is possible to maintain the threat of
regulation while leaving the issue unres2Red, time will teach us more
about what regulation, if any, is needed.
Unfortunately, the threat of regulation cannot indefinitely postpone the
need for actual regulation. In the U.S. political system, most policy topics
at most times will be of interest to a small number of policymakers, such as
those on a relevant Congressional subcommittee or regulatory commission.
This leads to periods of extended policy stability. Yet, as Baumgartner and
Jones explain, this "stability is punctuated with periods of volatile
change' 2  in a given policy domain. One major source of change, they
argue, is "an appeal by the disfavored side in a policy subsystem, or those
excluded entirely from the arrangement, to broader political processes-
Congress, the president, political parties, and public opinion.
'239
A key variable in the process is attention. Human attention serves as a
bottleneck on policy action, and institutional constraints further tighten the
bottleneck. Specialized venues such as the FCC will be able to follow most
of the issues under their supervision with adequate attention, but most of
the time the "broader political processes" pay no attention to those issues.
Elected representatives have so many constituencies clamoring for their
attention that even deciding which problems to attend to over the course of
an entire legislative session is a momentous task that necessarily leaves out
the vast majority of potential problems. The public, too, can pay attention
to just a small fraction of the important issues of the day; few advocacy
groups can keep ordinary citizens engaged for long enough to apply
sustained political pressure. Hence, most policy issues will be dealt with by
leaving the status quo in place--even in the face of mounting evidence that
the status quo has failed. Once enough evidence mounts that individuals or
institutions discover or rediscover it, however, the reaction is
disproportionate. The flip side of the human inability to pay attention to
237. Felten, supra note 114, at 10.
238. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (1993).
239. BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION: How
GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 5 (2005).
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many things at once is the depth with which we do pay attention to
something once it catches our gaze. This creates the cycle of punctuated
equilibriums. Congress and the President leave the status quo more or less
alone until they and the public pay attention to an issue, and that attention
is a necessary condition for major policy changes.
In the U.S., passing new legislation is far more difficult than winning
policy changes at the regulatory level, so it is best to pass legislation while
this issue has the attention of the Congress and the public. In contrast,
regulatory fights are much more winnable for the lesser-funded side in a
political conflict. 24 FCC decisions are built on statutory parameters, and
"[c]hanges in deeper-level rules usually are more difficult and more costly
to accomplish."
24 r
Broadband Internet service has come of age without Congress paying
much attention to its governance, delegating regulatory decisions to the
FCC. In the last five years, the Commission has changed the rules for
broadband so that it is now virtually unregulated, leaving the door open to
profiteering and discrimination. In 2006, however, the issue of broadband
regulation has captured the nation's attention.242 That attention cannot and
will not remain indefinitely.
If network neutrality fails to become law, nonprofit, educational, and
citizen groups-those who have led the call for network neutrality-will all
lose some degree of communication power on the tiered Internet. This will
erode their collective ability to make the call for reform in the future. If
network neutrality is the right policy, the time to strike is now.243 Without
strong neutrality mandates, the Internet will be profoundly different by the
time there is enough public attention to force the issue again-if that day
ever returns.
240. See, e.g., Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201: A Legislative History
and Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
121. Herman and Gandy argue, inter alia, that the U.S. Copyright Office is a relatively
captured agency. Nonetheless, they identify several instances in which the Office used its
authority under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) to side with nonprofits or individuals, despite
objections from copyright holders.
241. Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional
Analysis and Development Framework in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS, 35, 59 (Paul A.
Sabatier ed., 1999).
242. Dionne Searcey & Amy Schatz, 'Net Neutrality' Debate Is Roiling the Internet,
PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, June 14, 2006, available at http://www.post-gazette.comn/pg/06
165/698166-96.stm.
243. See generally Bill Herman, Responding to Felten 's Net Neutrality Paper, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, July 12, 2006, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/523; Bill Herman,




D. Unintended Regulatory Consequences
While Yoo might agree, other authors have carried the banner that
network neutrality is undesirable because the actual implementation of any
network neutrality regime will create regulatory nightmares. Many of these
authors support a generally neutral Internet as preferable, yet they conclude
that the regulatory cure is too likely to be worse than the discriminatory
disease. Some fear that the unintended consequences of regulation will
erode the value of the Internet. A few authors go so far as to implicitly and
preemptively accuse the FCC of malfeasance. I share the moderate critics'
fear that regulation will have unforeseeable consequences, and I share some
degree of the harshest critics' fear that the FCC may not implement
neutrality in the fairest manner possible. Nonetheless, the odds are thin that
the unforeseen consequences or the Commission's implementation will be
worse than the profiteering discrimination that will come without network
neutrality mandates.
Four noted scholars gathered at the Wharton School at the University
of Pennsylvania in June, 2006, and generally agreed that the unintended
consequences outweigh the benefits.2 44 The group included: David Farber,
Distinguished Career Professor of Computer Science and Public Policy at
the Carnegie Mellon University; Gerald Faulhaber, Professor of Business
and Public Policy at the Wharton School, and Professor of Law, University
of Pennsylvania; Michael Katz, Sarin Chair in Strategy and Leadership,
Haas School of Business, and Professor of Economics, University of
California, Berkeley; and Christopher Yoo. Farber describes the meeting as
an attempt "to provide an unbiased interdisciplinary analysis of network
neutrality." 245 They concluded, in part, that neutrality mandates "threaten
to restrict a wide range of innovative services without providing
compensating customer benefits. The problem is that it can be difficult, if
not impossible, to determine in advance whether a particular practice would
promote or harm competition." 246 In other words, network neutrality
regulations would prevent both undesirable and desirable innovations in
network engineering and broadband business models. They recommend
relying on antitrust law because it can be more neatly tailored to specific
244. Posting of David Farber to ip@v2lisbox.com, [IP] "Common Sense About Network
Neutrality ", http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/200606/msgOOO
4.html (June 2, 2006, 16:12 EST).
245. Id. All four are extremely qualified to investigate the matter, but the claim to
"unbiased" investigation is of questionable credibility. Faulhaber, Katz, and Yoo have
received research or consulting money from telecommunications and cable companies.
Posting of Jeff Chester to Digital Destiny, Dave Farber, Net Neutrality, and the Verizon
Connection, http://www.democraticmedia.org/jcblog/?p=64 (Aug. 1, 2006, 15:04 EST).
246. Farber, supra note 244.
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violations, itself a problematic solution addressed above.
248
An even more stridently anti-regulation writer is Timothy B. Lee,
policy analyst at the Show-Me Institute-not to be confused with Tim
Berners-Lee, the world-famous inventor of the Web and a strong supporter
of network neutrality mandates.249 Timothy B. Lee insists that BSPs will
have more sway than any other group in hearings before the FCC and will
therefore "turn the regulatory process to their advantage. ' 250 He draws
from a vivid historical example of the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC"), founded in 1887. "After President Grover Cleveland appointed
Thomas M. Cooley, a railroad ally, as its first chairman, the commission
quickly fell under the control of the railroads, gradually transforming the
American transportation industry into a cartel.'
2
Yet this historic analogy, and its applicability to the network
neutrality problem, is highly problematic. Even the ICC, the most clichd
-252
example of regulatory capture, was not necessarily a bad policy decision
when compared with the alternative of allowing market abuses to continue
unabated. One study concludes "that the legislation did not provide
railroads with a cartel manager but was instead a compromise among many
contending interests.'253 In contrast with Lee's very simplistic story of
capture by a single interest group, "a multiple-interest-group perspective is
frequently necessary to understand the inception of regulation.'2
54
BSPs are certainly the most well-organized interest group involved on
this issue; they have the most political clout, and they spend several times
more on lobbying and campaign contributions than do Internet
companies. 25 5 Yet many groups beside BSPs are involved in the network
neutrality debate, including: technology law advocates such as Public
247. Farber, supra note 244. In describing the group's conclusions, Faulhaber concludes
that an antitrust settlement, "takes much less time than the FCC." Getting a Fix on Network
Neutrality, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, June 14, 2006, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/a
rticleid=1497&CFID=1323070&CFTOKEN=86579601. The timeframe of years in the
Netscape antitrust case contrasts sharply with the 90-day window in the Snowe-Dorgan bill,
however, suggesting that Faulhaber has it backwards.
248. See discussion, supra Part V.
249. Posting by Tim Bemers-Lee to timbl's blog, Net Neutrality: This is Serious,
Decentralized Information Group, http://dig.csail.mit.edu/breadcrumbs/node/144 (June 21,
2006, 16:35 EST).
250. Timothy B. Lee, Entangling the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2006, at A22.
251. Id.
252. LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGANIZATIONS, AND POLITICS: MOTOR
FREIGHT POLICY AT THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 3 (1994).
253. Thomas W. Gilligan et al., Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 32 J. L. & ECON. 35,36 (1989).
254. Id. at 60.
255. See Caruso, supra note 19.
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Knowledge, Free Press, and the Center for Democracy and Technology;
political groups such as MoveOn and the Christian Coalition; and dotcoms
such as Google, Amazon, and eBay. The actual implementation of
neutrality mandates will therefore likely represent a compromise between
these interests.
Lee, however, insists that the FCC will do worse than fail to do the
unqualified bidding of neutrality proponents. His:
big fear is not so much that the FCC will screw up the regulation of the
Baby Bells (it's hard to imagine that market being any more screwed
up) but that FCC regulation will metastasize into a generalized barrier
to entry for offering broadband access-that the incumbents will find a
way to interIrf5 the law in a way that's difficult for new entrants to
comply with.
Lee insists that the FCC currently has "no authoriy' that would allow it to257
prevent new entrants to the broadband market. This is a half-truth at
best. The FCC was formed and continues to serve as a means of regulating
the airwaves, 2 58 and wireless transmission is the single best hope for
establishing a third commonly adopted vehicle for broadband delivery. The
FCC is therefore already in a position to limit the ability of new BSPs to
spring up. Instead, the Commission has made several policy changes to
facilitate wireless Internet transmissions. 2 59 Power lines are another
potential vehicle for broadband delivery. Several groups, including
broadcasters-long reputed as having captured the FCC 2--asked the FCC
to rule that broadband-over-power-lines ("BPL") creates interference with
their transmissions and to limit or disallow the service. Instead, the FCC
"affirmed that BPL providers have the right to provide data access using
power transmission lines, provided they don't interfere with existing radio,,261
services. Despite concerns about the FCC's rulemaking in other262
areas, the Commission is not a fully captured agency but rather supports
256. Timothy B. Lee, Regulatory Firewall, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT, July 14,
2006, http://www.techliberation.com/archives/040158.php.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993).
259. Robert Primosch, FCC Creating New Opportunities for Wireless Broadband, THE
WIRELESS INTERNET INSTITUTE, June 23, 2004, http://www.w2i.org/pages/oped/2004/0623
.html.
260. Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Digital Television and the Quid Pro
Quo, 2 Bus. & POL. 115 (2000), available at http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol2/iss2/art2.
261. Wayne Rash, FCC Supports Broadband over Power Lines, EXTREME TECH, Aug. 3,
2006, http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,1697,1998734,00.asp. See Amendment of Part
15 regarding new requirements and measurement guidelines for Access Broadband over
Power Line Systems, FCC 06-113 (Aug. 7, 2006), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/atta
chmatch/FCC-06-113A1 .pdf.
262. Hazlett & Spitzer provide a reasonable recap of the argument that the FCC does not
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competition in the broadband industry.
The realistic version of Lee's story of regulatory captures is therefore
that the Commission will fail to give network neutrality regulations real
teeth. BSPs will violate network neutrality principles, the Commission will
slap their wrists, and BSPs will only temporarily stop engaging in
anticompetitive packet discrimination. Even then, the threat of regulatory
sanction will generally prevent BSPs from flagrantly discriminating
between Internet content for excess profits. 2 63 This scenario is markedly
preferable to a broadband market where BSPs deliberately and willfully
slow some websites and applications, speeding others and charging tolls for
the fast lane. A regime in which BSPs are still implicitly allowed to
discriminate is far better than one in which they may charge for such
discrimination, because discrimination will still be rare in the former
scenario. Only services that compete with BSPs' core business models will
be endangered, and the FCC has already shown its willingness to act in
those cases.264 This is the realistically negative scenario, and it looks vastly
preferable to BSPs' new business model.
VII. CONCLUDING BITS
The principle of generalized network neutrality is responsible for the
Internet revolution, and it would be poor policymaking to allow BSPs to
erode that principle in the name of better profit margins. Widespread
broadband discrimination would cause substantial economic and social
losses. The continued and varied forms of discrimination are noteworthy
and regrettable, but the impending threat of unrestrained profiteering is
much worse. By threatening to ban, block, or extract the value from online
communication, BSPs reduce the incentive to create new technologies, and
they threaten to erode the remarkable ethos of unpaid online production.
Even if rare, the mere possibility of BSP censorship is a clear danger to
First Amendment values.
In the face of such actual and potential discrimination, it would be
wonderful if consumers could switch providers in a competitive market;
unfortunately, the broadband market is characterized by regional duopolies,
a problem that will likely continue in the foreseeable future. Unless
force broadcasters to meet their statutory public interest obligations. See Hazlett & Spitzer,
supra note 261. Others argue that the Commission is too eager to disassemble limitations
on media ownership. See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM, supra note 51.
263. Even in the scenario in which the FCC virtually never enforces the Snowe-Dorgan
Bill, Verizon will still be prevented from sending Google a monthly bill-a written record
demanding payment for its violations of federal law-for Verizon's not throttling Google's
data.




Congress orders the FCC to enforce network neutrality, innovators and
consumers will be at the whim of a few large broadband providers. As
outlined above, however, Congress could work to provide a reasonable
guarantee that BSPs will not interfere with nondestructive communication.
The Snowe-Dorgan Bill will not prevent BSPs from successfully
managing their networks; it provides reasonable and explicit exceptions for
preventing destructive uses, and it does not preclude useful deviations from
a pure end-to-end design such as local caching. In an era where BSPs
ranging in size from state universities to major commercial BSPs already
monitor their users' total per-week or per-month bandwidth usage, BSPs
should be expected to impose bandwidth limits neutrally rather than
picking technological winners and losers. Further, the Bill will not prevent
the healthy evolution of networking technologies. While the FCC is an
imperfect regulatory body, the negative impacts from the looming threat of
discrimination far outweigh the negative impacts of any realistic
disadvantage based on imperfect regulatory capture. Preventing broadband
discrimination, even imperfectly, will greatly improve the economic and
social value of the Internet for years to come.
Decades of bipartisan regulatory tradition forced telecommunications
companies to provide access to their lines on a nondiscriminatory basis,
doing so for purposes both economic and democratic. This tradition
brought us the rapid adoption of the Internet, widely hailed as an
unprecedented source of uncontrolled innovation and uncensored speech.
At the time of this writing, the future of the broadband Internet has
yet to be written. If Congress fails to preserve network neutrality, that
future may be channeled through the short-term interests of a few powerful
broadband companies. In contrast, if strong regulation forces broadband
companies to leave their bottlenecks open to all data, regardless of
application or content, the unexpected innovations in applications and
content will continue to astound us for years to come.
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